The Sentinel – The Quarterly News Bulletin In Competition Law

We’re back with a fresh edition of ‘The Sentinel’ - CMS INDUSLAW’s quarterly chronicle of all things competition law. From significant decisions of the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”), and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”), to various High Courts, this edition captures the pulse of India’s evolving competition ecosystem.

And for those short on time, a distilled and delightful reckoner of key developments from the last quarter (“Q4”) of the financial year (“FY”) 2025-26 awaits in the flowchart below. 

1.1 DECISIONS OF THE HIGH COURT

a. The Delhi High Court dismisses International Flavours and Fragrances Inc.’s petition challenging the CCI’s order directing investigation against global fragrance manufacturers [1]

On February 23, 2026, the Delhi High Court (“DHC”) dismissed the writ petition filed by International Flavours and Fragrances Inc. (“IFF”) challenging the CCI’s order directing an investigation in relation to alleged coordination among global fragrance manufacturers, arising from the 2023 dawn raids and subsequent leniency applications. [2]  IFF had primarily challenged the order on limitation grounds, arguing that the delay in filing information could not be condoned and that limitation affects substantive rights of the parties. 

The DHC held that:

1. The CCI had validly exercised its discretion under the second proviso to Section 19(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 (“Competition Act”) by condoning the delay, based on: (i) the informant’s explanation regarding discovery of conduct post-2023 dawn raids; and (ii) prompt approach under the leniency framework;
2. The CCI had also considered the possibility of a continuing cause of action, thereby justifying initiation of proceedings despite the time gap; and
3. Orders under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act are administrative in nature and does not determine rights or liabilities. Accordingly, such orders do not merit judicial interference at a preliminary stage, especially in the absence of any adverse findings against the petitioner.

In light of the above, the DHC set aside the writ petition.

1.2 DECISIONS OF THE NCLAT

a. NCLAT upholds CCI’s penalty against Klassy Enterprises in bid-rigging case [3] 

On January 7, 2026, the NCLAT dismissed an appeal filed by M/S Klassy Enterprises (“Klassy Enterprises”) challenging CCI’s order [4]  imposing a penalty of INR 10 lakhs (approximately USD 10,746 [5])  each on Klassy Enterprises and its authorised dealers M/s Nayan Agencies (“Narayan Agencies”), and  M/s Jawahar Brothers (“Jwahar Brothers”), for anti-competitive conduct and bid rigging pertaining to the tender floated by People's All India Anti-Corruption and Crime Prevention Society (IP), for supply of picofall-cum-sewing machines.

The NCLAT concurred with the findings of the CCI and observed that:

1. Minimal difference in bid prices (as low as in the range of INR 11 – INR 28 (approximately USD 0.12 – USD 0.30)) among the bidders was highly improbable in a competitive market. Klassy Enterprises’ justifications [6]  were rejected since no supporting cost data or evidence was produced, making the similarity suggestive of prior coordination rather than coincidence; 
2. NCLAT placed significant reliance on the fund flow evidence, noting that Klassy Enterprises effectively arranged and routed the earnest money deposit/tender fees for other bidders, and refunds were channelled back to it. This was seen as clear evidence of a pre-existing understanding and coordinated participation, inconsistent with independent bidding behaviour; 
3. Submission of bids through the same IP address (belonging to the cyber café run by Klassy Enterprises) is highly unlikely among genuine competitors. Klassy Enterprises’ defence of operating a cyber cafe/providing tender service was dismissed due to lack of credible evidence, reinforcing the inference of collusion; 
4. Call data records showed continuous and timed communication between bidders during crucial stages of the tender. While interaction per se is not illegal, in this context it indicated active coordination and exchange of information, supporting the existence of a cartel; 
5. The NCLAT relied on multiple plus factors, including: (a) mobile location of Narayan Agencies at the premises of Klassy Enterprises during the filling of the Bill of Quantity; (b) close and ongoing business relationships between parties; and (c) similar conduct in other tenders indicating a pattern of coordination.  Collectively, these factors established that the parties were not acting independently but as a coordinated group; and
6. Direct evidence of cartelisation is rare, and such conduct is typically inferred from surrounding circumstances. Here, the cumulative evidence (pricing, financial links, common IP address usage, frequent communications) clearly demonstrated a meeting of minds.

In light of the above, the NCLAT dismissed the appeal filed by Klassy Enterprises and upheld the penalty, noting that the CCI correctly applied the ‘relevant turnover’ principle and imposed a proportionate penalty considering the gravity of cartel conduct.

b. NCLAT sets aside CCI’s order exonerating Chettinad International Coal Terminal Pvt. Ltd. from allegations of abuse of dominance [7]

On January 21, 2026, the NCLAT set aside the CCI’s final order [8],  which after a detailed investigation dismissed information against Chettinad International Coal Terminal Pvt. Ltd. (“CICTPL”) and Kamarajar Port Limited, and remanded the case back to the CCI for fresh adjudication.

Background of proceedings before the CCI:

The matter originated from an information filed by Tamil Nadu Power Producer Association [9]  (“TNPPA”) against CICTPL for alleged abuse of dominant position. The informant submitted that prior to October 2011, its members and other coal buyers had a choice to use the facility of either Chennai Port Trust (“CPT”) or CICPTL and the charges levied by CICTPL were less owing to the competitive constraints posed by CPT. However, pursuant to the Madras High Court orders banning import of coal from CPT (due to environmental problems including air pollution and dust), CICTPL effectively became the only viable coal terminal for several power producers in the region. Post this shift, CICPT allegedly: (i) increased the coal handling charges from INR 180/metric tonne (“MT”) to INR 300/MT (approximately USD 1.93/MT – USD 3.22/MT) ; and (ii) imposed “coordination and liaisoning charges”, through third-party entities allegedly linked to CICTPL.

The CCI, prima facie, found CICTPL to be dominant in the market for “provision of coal terminal services in and around Kamarajar Port” and directed the Director General, CCI (“DG”) to conduct an investigation. In its prima facie order the CCI rejected CICTPL’s contention that alternative ports like Krishnapatnam Port and Karaikal Port ought to be included in the geographic market definition. 

After its investigation, the DG in its first report expanded the relevant geographic market to include Krishnapatnam Port observing that both Kamarajar Port and Krishnapatnam Port were viable substitutes to each other. Accordingly, the DG concluded that CICTPL was not dominant. However, based on TNPPA’s objections, the CCI remanded the matter back to the DG on account of consideration of incorrect data. Thereafter, in its supplementary report, the DG reversed its position, holding that the two ports (i.e., the Kamarajar Port and Krishnapatnam Port) constituted distinct markets. It further noted that CICTPL was dominant and had engaged in abusive conduct. Despite this, in its final order in 2021, the CCI relied on the findings of the first DG report, expanded the market definition, and ultimately closed the case observing that CICTPL was not dominant.

The NCLAT held that:

1. The CCI erred in expanding the relevant geographic market to include Krishnapatnam Port. It emphasised that relevant market must reflect the “area of effective competition”, assessed from the user’s perspective, taking into account transportation costs, plant proximity, logistics infrastructure, and operational efficiency;
2. Krishnapatnam Port was not a viable substitute for Kamarajar Port, given the significant distance (approximately 176 kilometers), higher logistics costs, and location-specific requirements of power producers. Users generally prefer ports in close proximity to their plants, and occasional or exigency-based use of other ports does not establish substitutability;
3. The NCLAT rejected the CCI’s reliance on coastline proximity, overlapping hinterland, and aggregate volume data, holding that economic feasibility and consumer behaviour must take precedence over theoretical substitutability. The CCI failed to adequately consider the DG’s supplementary findings and deviated from its own prima facie view. As such, the NCLAT concluded that the relevant market should be confined to the “provision of common user coal terminal services in and around Kamarajar Port”;
4. Within the correctly defined market, CICTPL was the sole provider of common user coal terminal services, as other berths were captive and unavailable to third parties. Relying on factors such as high entry barriers, infrastructure constraints, and strong consumer dependence, the NCLAT concluded that CICTPL enjoyed a dominant position. Despite significant increases in port charges, the volume of coal handled by CICTPL continued to rise, indicating that users were unable to switch to alternative ports, which is indicative of market power and absence of effective competition;
5. Both the DG’s supplementary report and the CCI’s own analysis established that the coordination and liaisoning charges were mandatory in practice, with users compelled to avail such services as a condition for accessing terminal services;
6. The nature and scope of coordination and liaisoning services were unclear, lacked economic rationale and were imposed as supplementary obligations unrelated to the core service, which no rational importer would voluntarily undertake. The entities levying such charges were directly or indirectly controlled by the Chettinad Group, establishing a clear linkage with CICTPL, even in the absence of direct financial flow-back; and
7. Once dominance was established, the mandatory imposition of third-party charges and their unilateral and excessive nature amounted to imposition of unfair conditions under Section 4 of the Competition Act. It disagreed with the CCI’s characterisation of the conduct as merely “opportunistic,” noting that such conduct would clearly constitute abuse once dominance was established.   

In light of the above, the NCLAT set aside the CCI’s order and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication, directing the CCI to reconsider the case in accordance with law after providing an opportunity of hearing to the parties including all fresh evidence.

1.3 DECISIONS BY THE CCI 

In Q4 of FY 2025-26, the CCI issued a total of 13 (thirteen) orders in relation to enforcement matters. Of these, the CCI: 

1. Passed 2 (two) orders finding contravention of the provisions of the Competition Act;
2. Directed the DG to investigate 3 (three) matters;
3. Declined to investigate 7 (seven) information relating to allegations of abuse of dominance and anti-competitive agreements; and
4. Disagreed with the DG’s findings of contravention and closed 1 (one) investigation.

A summary of the noteworthy cases is set out below:

a. The CCI finds KKK Mills and Sankeshwar Synthetics guilty of bid-rigging, issues a cease-and-desist order [10]

On January 2, 2026, the CCI found M/s KKK Mills (“KKK Mills”) and M/s Sankeshwar Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. (“Sankeshwar Synthetics”) guilty of bid-rigging in a defence procurement tender for woollen underpants floated by the Directorate General of Ordnance Services (“DGOS”) and issued a cease-and-desist order. KKK Mills and Sankeshwar Synthetics are collectively referred to as the “Defendants”.

According to the reference filed by CP Cell, Master General of Ordnance Branch, DGOS, an initial tender issued in July 2019 was cancelled after the Defendants quoted identical price (INR 127.90 (approximately USD 1.37), raising suspicion of cartelisation. In the re-tender issued in November 2020, the Defendants who were declared the lowest, i.e., L-1 bidders, had again quoted identical price (INR 122.75 (approximately USD 1.32).

After the issuance of a prima facie order, completion of the DG’s investigation, and hearing the Defendants at length, the CCI finally noted the following:

1. The CCI rejected the Defendants’ argument that the tender being a rate contract (“RC”) negated cartelisation [11] , noting that rates and terms are finalised through a competitive bidding process, after which the RC process comes into operation. Additionally, the nature of the tender process could not be considered to dilute cartelisation concerns; 
2. The CCI dismissed the claim that the market was an oligopsony [12] , holding that the Defendants could sell their textile/hosiery products to multiple private buyers as well as other governmental buyers such as Central Reserve Police Force, Indo Tibetan Border Police, etc., and were not dependent solely on the Ministry of Defence;
3. Identical pricing up to two decimal points in two separate tenders could not be explained by market conditions and indicated a mutual decision by the Defendants to secure the L-1 status;
4. The Defendants submitted their bids on the same date and within minutes of each other in both the 2019 and 2020–21 tenders, evidencing coordinated bid submission. The repeated pattern of identical prices and near-simultaneous bid submissions across different years, went beyond price parallelism and supported the inference of concerted action;
5. The CCI found clear evidence of prior and ongoing contact between the Defendants, including through a related entity of Sankeshwar Synthetics, and noted that Sankeshwar Synthetics’s director had made false statements on oath regarding this relationship; 
6. E-mails, call data records, and bank transactions showed that the Defendants were regularly communicating, including discussions on several tenders, contradicting their claim of no contact. Evidence from other tenders revealed sharing of bid rates, coordination during reverse auctions, and division of supply orders, establishing a pattern of collusion and price fixing across several tenders; and
7. The CCI rejected the Defendants’ argument that there was no direct evidence of coordination, holding that communications before bid submission and multiple “plus factors” demonstrated collusive behaviour. While familial or business links alone are insufficient to prove collusion, in this case they were accompanied by synchronised bidding, identical pricing in separate tenders, and sustained coordination, collectively establishing a collusive agreement.

However, the CCI limited its final order to a cease-and-desist direction alone and refrained from imposing any monetary penalty. This was on account of considering multiple mitigating factors such as cancellation of the tender, absence of any gain, the Defendants’ MSME (i.e., micro, small, and medium enterprise) status, low profitability, long-standing supplies to the armed forces, and the risk of insolvency.

b. The CCI initiates an investigation against IndiGo for alleged abuse of dominance [13]

On February 4, 2026, the CCI initiated an investigation against InterGlobe Aviation Limited (“IndiGo”) based on an information filed by Kartikeya Rawal alleging that the Indigo abused its dominant position through large-scale flight cancellations followed by charging excessive airfares. The informant alleged that IndiGo cancelled the informant’s return flight booked at INR 7,173 (approximately USD 77.08) from Delhi to Bengaluru at a short notice and without offering any alternative arrangements. This forced the informant to wait for 2 days and rebook a subsequent flight (also being operated by IndiGo) at a substantially higher fare of INR 17,000 (approximately USD 183) due to lack of reasonably priced alternatives.

IndiGo in response to the information, submitted that:

1. The information falls outside the jurisdiction of the CCI, as the issues raised are governed by the Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024 (“BVA”) and the Aircraft Rules, 1937, (“Aircraft Rules”) under which the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (“DGCA”) has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to airfare regulation, unfair practices, and alleged oligopolistic behaviour; and
2. The BVA and Aircraft Rules constitute a complete and self-contained regulatory framework for the civil aviation sector, and the very issues raised in the Information are already within the regulatory domain of the DGCA, leaving no scope for competition law intervention. Thus, where the Government of India (through the Parliament) has enacted a specialised regulatory regime, the jurisdiction of the CCI over allegations of abuse of dominance stands impliedly excluded.

Notably, the CCI had also contacted the DGCA for further appreciation of the matter and had sought: (i) information relating to the domestic aviation market structure and market shares for FY 2023–24 and FY 2024–25; (ii) airline-wise capacity, passenger traffic and month-wise passenger data for the year 2025; (iii) identification of routes where IndiGo operated as the sole airline; (iv) year-wise revenue details of airlines from FY 2021–22 to FY 2024–25; (v) route-wise and category-wise average fares during the period from 1–15 December 2025; and (vi) details of routes and passengers affected by the disruptions along with comparative fare data of IndiGo and competing airlines. 

The DGCA in its response to the CCI stated that as per the prevailing regulatory framework, airfares are not regulated by the DGCA and that the DGCA has not been vested with economic regulatory powers in respect of civil aviation and air transport services under the BVA. DGCA further clarified that it ensures compliance with Rule 135(2) of the Aircraft Rules by mandating airlines to publish their tariff sheets on their respective websites, with a view to ensuring transparency for passengers. Additionally, the DGCA provided the requested details to the CCI with the exception of IndiGo’s data since according to the DGCA, IndiGo had sought additional time to furnish the required information.

The CCI held that: 

1. Sectoral regulation does not oust the CCI’s jurisdiction as competition law and sectoral laws operate in distinct fields and only the CCI can examine conduct from the lens of the Competition Act. The CCI has previously examined competition issues in the aviation sector, and the sector is not immune from competition law scrutiny merely because it is regulated by the DGCA;
2. Rule 135 of the Aircraft Rules relates to tariff formulation and transparency and confers only supervisory and corrective powers on the DGCA. These powers do not extend to determining abuse of dominance or other competition law violations. The CCI noted DGCA’s clarification that it lacks economic regulatory powers and does not undertake competition law analysis such as market definition, dominance assessment, or evaluation of adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”). The existence of remedies under the BVS does not bar the CCI’s jurisdiction, as competition law remedies are aimed at preserving the competitive process and market structure;
3. IndiGo’s flight cancellations caused a system-wide capacity shock across multiple routes, affecting passengers nationwide. Accordingly, the relevant market was defined as” the “market for domestic air passenger transport services in India”. In this market, IndiGo holds a prima facie dominant position, with around 60–61% capacity share, exclusive operations on over 330 routes, extensive network coverage, the largest fleet, and sustained profitability, in a highly concentrated market;
4. The conduct of IndiGo cancelling its flights at a mass scale, left the passengers with no real alternatives and they were compelled to rebook at significantly higher prices, may amount to imposition of unfair conditions under Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act; and
5. Further, by cancelling a large portion of its scheduled capacity, IndiGo may have withheld services and created artificial scarcity, potentially amounting to restriction of services under Section 4(2)(b)(i) of the Competition Act.

Accordingly, the CCI found a prima facie case warranting investigation against IndiGo and directed the DG to examine the matter further.

c. The CCI penalizes Intel for abuse of dominant position [14]

On February 12, 2026, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 27.38 crores (approximately USD 2.94 million) on Intel Corporation (“Intel”) for abuse of its dominant position.

The informant [15]  submitted that prior to April 2016, Intel provided global warranty on the boxed microprocessors (“BMPs”), meaning customers in India could claim warranty even if the product was purchased abroad. However, from April 2016, Intel introduced an India-specific warranty policy, under which warranty in India would be given only for BMPs purchased from its authorised distributors in India. Products sourced from overseas distributors would be denied warranty in India, requiring customers to claim warranty in the country of purchase. Further, the informant alleged that:

1. Intel holds a dominant position in the relevant market for “sale of BMPs for desktop and laptop personal computers (“PC”) in India”;
2. Intel imposed unfair and discriminatory conditions by restricting warranty to India-sourced products, in violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act. Further, it violated Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act by limiting the business of other resellers/parallel importers by effectively disabling after-sales support; 
3. The agreement between Intel and its authorised distributors in India gives the distributors exclusive selling rights in India, which is violative of Section 3(4)(c) of the Competition Act; and
4. Refusal to provide warranty for products sourced outside authorised channels results in depriving consumers of choices, harming independent resellers, and amounts to refusal to deal, in violation of Section 3(4)(d) of the Competition Act. 

The CCI considered the informant’s allegations and in its prima facie order noted Intel’s argument that the agreement between Intel and its authorised distributors was not in the nature of exclusive distribution agreement and that its authorised distributors could sell micro-processors of any brand. Accordingly, the CCI ruled out any concerns regarding vertical restraints in contravention of Section 3(4) of the Competition Act and directed the DG to investigate in relation to the allegations of abuse of dominant position by Intel.

Upon the completion of DG’s investigation and during the opportunity of oral hearing, Intel raised certain procedural objections. The CCI, at the outset, rejected these, including Intel’s objections regarding the DG’s reliance on third parties, the informant approaching the CCI with unclean hands, and denial of cross-examination of third parties. It held that the CCI proceedings are in rem and that the DG’s investigation was sufficiently broad-based. On merits, the CCI observed that:

1. The relevant market ought to be delineated as “BMPs for desktop PCs in India” [16] . Intel is dominant in the relevant market given its consistently high market shares, significant lead over its closest competitor, strong intellectual property, scale, brand strength, and high entry barriers including capital intensity and R&D requirements; 
2. Intel’s India-specific warranty policy was unfair and discriminatory as it denied warranty services in India for genuine products purchased from authorised distributors outside India, unlike other jurisdictions where global warranty was available, thereby violating Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act;
3. The policy was also found to restrict consumer choice and distort pricing, as it disincentivised parallel imports (which were often available at significantly lower prices – differences being in the range of 44% –133%) and effectively forced consumers to purchase from authorised distributors at higher prices, in violation of Section 4(2)(b)(i) of the Competition Act;
4. The policy also nudged parallel importers/traders from buying from Intel’s authorised distribution channels in India, strengthening Intel’s authorised network as evidenced by internal communications and changes in channel structures. The policy resulted in denial of market access to parallel importers, as their sales stagnated or declined post-2016 while authorised distributors’ share increased significantly, thereby violating Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act;
5. The CCI rejected Intel’s justifications relating to counterfeit risks and protection of authorised distributors, noting that: (a) authenticity could be verified through existing tools; and (b) the restriction was based on place of purchase, not product genuineness; and
6. The CCI also rejected Intel’s argument that warranty denial had minimal impact due to low claim rates and held that warranty is a critical parameter in purchase decisions, especially for high-value products, and that redirecting claims abroad is commercially impractical and tantamount to denial. The CCI held that Intel’s change in its policy caused AAEC, as it limited consumer choice, increased prices, and foreclosed competitive channels, even if the number of actual warranty rejections was relatively small.

In light of the above, the CCI found Intel to have abused its dominant position in contravention of Section 4 of the Competition Act. In terms of imposing penalty, the CCI noted that while the policy remained in force for eight years (2016–2024), there were certain mitigating factors such as its subsequent withdrawal [17],  Intel’s cooperation during investigation, and market dynamics, and imposed a penalty of INR 27.38 crores (approximately USD 2.94 million). Intel was further directed to publicise the withdrawal of the impugned policy and submit a compliance report within 60 days of the receipt of the CCI’s order.

d. The CCI closes abuse of dominance allegations against BookMyShow [18]

On March 12, 2026, the CCI closed the investigation against Big Tree Entertainment Private Limited ("BookMyShow") for alleged abuse of dominant position. On June 16, 2022, the CCI directed an investigation against an information filed by an individual, who sought to compete with BookMyShow through its own platform for online booking of movie tickets i.e., Showtyme. The informant alleged that BookMyShow abused its dominance by: (i) entering into exclusive agreement/ arrangement(s) with certain cinema theatres in the city of Hyderabad, Telangana, which allegedly prevented the informant from offering the services of its website Showtyme to cinema theatres for online booking of movie tickets; and (ii) charging high convenience fee from the cinegoers for online booking of movie tickets.

The CCI, prima facie, found BookMyShow to be dominant in the “market for online intermediation services for booking of movie tickets in India”. The CCI prima facie observed that BookMyShow’s exclusive agreements with cinema theatres prevented them from engaging competing platforms, thereby potentially foreclosing competition and raising entry barriers for new intermediaries. The CCI also noted that the monetary deposits linked to restrictions on contracting with competitors appeared designed to discourage theatres from associating with rival platforms. Additionally, BookMyShow’s exclusive control over data collected from single-screen theatres (while sharing such data with multiplexes) could enhance its bargaining power and strengthen network effects over time. Finally, although the CCI stated it cannot regulate prices, it noted that the high convenience fee charged by BookMyShow may be a consequence of reduced competitive pressure resulting from its exclusive arrangements.

The DG observed that:

1. Online ticketing platforms are not substitutable with box-office ticket sales as they provide additional benefits such as convenience, comparison of showtimes across theatres, multiple payment options, cancellations and promotional offers. Accordingly, the DG defined the relevant market as the “market for online intermediation services for booking of movie tickets in India”;
2. BookMyShow is dominant in the relevant market, considering its significantly higher market share, strong financial position, first-mover advantage, vertical integration, high entry barriers, dependence of consumers and cinemas on its platform, and lack of countervailing buyer power;
3. BookMyShow’s practice of reserving a portion of seat inventory in agreements with single-screen cinemas restricted the availability of seats across platforms and imposed unfair and discriminatory conditions on cinemas who lack bargaining power, violating Sections 4(2)(a)(i) and 4(2)(b)(i) of the Competition Act;
4. The DG also noted that BookMyShow did not share any customer data with theatres except in exceptional circumstances involving customer complaints or refund issues. This imposition of discriminatory conditions along with sharing information in hashed format ensured that non-big chain cinemas could not target or steer away customers by offering them better terms and also restricted opportunities for various cinemas to come together under a common umbrella and offer competitive services to BookMyShow. Thus, the BookMyShow’s discriminatory approach in respect of sharing data with single screens, compared to their treatment of data with multiplexes has resulted in violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act;
5. The DG found significant variation in revenue sharing of the convenience fee between multiplexes and smaller cinemas, without objective justification, and concluded that BookMyShow imposed discriminatory terms in violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act; and
6. BookMyShow’s exclusive and restrictive agreements with cinemas, often coupled with lock-in clauses, security deposits/adjustable advances and restrictions on appointing competing aggregators, foreclosed a substantial portion of the market and denied market access to competitors, thereby violating Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act.

Having agreed with the DG on the delineation of relevant market and BookMyShow’s dominant position, the CCI, on merits, held that: 

1. Reservation of seats for BookMyShow in certain agreements did not amount to an unfair or discriminatory condition. It accepted BookMyShow’s explanation that such reservation was necessary in certain cases - particularly in tier-2 and tier-3 cities - to avoid overlapping bookings where cinemas lack real-time integration systems. Accordingly, no violation of Sections 4(2)(a)(i) or 4(2)(b)(i) of the Competition Act was found;
2. The CCI found that customer data ownership practices did not amount to discrimination. It held that multiplexes and single-screen cinemas did not constitute a homogenous class and therefore different data-sharing arrangements between them could not be treated as discriminatory. Consequently, no contravention of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act was established;
3. The CCI observed that revenue-sharing arrangements vary depending on several factors, such as scale of operations, costs associated with a particular model and business negotiations. It also found instances where single-screen cinemas received substantial shares of convenience fees. Therefore, no evidence of discriminatory conduct under Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act was established; and
4. Although BookMyShow entered into some exclusive agreements and lock-in arrangements, the Commission found insufficient evidence to show that these agreements foreclosed the market or denied access to competitors. The CCI also accepted BookMyShow’s explanation that lock-in periods were incorporated so that BookMyShow would get sufficient time to recover the advance, considering the estimated revenue from that cinema. Further, the existence of competing platforms, the limited proportion of exclusive agreements relative to total cinema screens, and the expiry of agreements at different times indicated that the market remained contestable, and no violation of Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act could be established. 

Accordingly, the CCI concluded that no abuse of dominance under Sections 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(b)(i), or 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act was established, and therefore closed the case.

e. The CCI dismisses information against Google over termination of developer account

On March 24, 2026, the CCI dismissed an information against Google India Pvt. Ltd. (“Google”), alleging that Google had abused its dominant position by arbitrarily terminating the informant’s [20]  Google Developer Account without justification.

The informant alleged that: 

1. The informant’s first developer account was terminated on the ground of policy violations [21]  linked to an application, which the informant claimed did not belong to it but that it was developed and published by an external contractual developer. Despite the informant terminating all contractual relations with the concerned developer and requesting Google to limit action to the specific application, Google terminated the informant’s entire account, ignoring requests for a fair review of compliant apps;
2. Google failed to provide reasonable justifications and terminated the informant’s account in an arbitrary and unjust manner, thereby violating principles of natural justice. Further, the application responsible for alleged violations continued to remain available on the Google Play Store under different developer account;
3. The informant’s second developer account was also terminated on the basis of past policy violations associated with the first account, without substantiating such linkage, and accompanied by a warning against creating new accounts. According to the informant, this effectively denied it market access and prevented re-entry into the Android app distribution ecosystem; and
4. Google’s conduct resulted in the informant incurring financial losses, reputational harm, and exclusion from the market, and amounted to abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act.

Google submitted that:

1. The issues raised by the Informant were already settled in Liberty Infospace Private Limited vs. Alphabet Inc and Others [22] (“Liberty Case”), where the CCI upheld the validity of its policies and appeal mechanisms. Accordingly, it argued that in line with Section 26(2A) of the Competition Act, no fresh inquiry should be undertaken by the CCI as the present case involved substantially similar issues to the Liberty Case;
2. The informant failed to define an appropriate relevant market as well as demonstrate how the alleged anticompetitive conduct was related to the market for app store for Android OS. Merely limiting the market to Android app stores was incorrect. Further, the issue of market definition is pending before the Supreme Court of India and therefore, the CCI should not delineate a relevant market in the present case;
3. The termination of the informant’s first account was based on legitimate policy enforcement, specifically violations of Google’s policies preventing malware and behavior transparency issues related to deceptive behavior. The subsequent termination of the second account was justified under its policy which prohibits developers with prior violations from creating new accounts to bypass enforcement;
4. Google’s policies are transparent, consistently applied, and essential for platform integrity, user safety, and prevention of abuse, and that enforcement actions are commercially necessary to protect the ecosystem. It emphasised that it has no incentive to arbitrarily remove compliant developers, as doing so would harm the Play Store’s growth and user base;
5. Google had provided adequate reasons for termination and a fair appeals process, with multiple review opportunities. Limited disclosure of technical details is justified to prevent misuse and circumvention of its enforcement systems;
6. The informant failed to demonstrate any abuse of dominance or AAEC, as the actions were routine policy enforcement with no evidence of market-wide harm, denial of access, or restriction of competition.

The CCI delineated the relevant market as “the market for app stores for Android OS in India” and, consistent with its previous decisions on Google, reaffirmed Google’s dominant position therein. On merits, The CCI observed that:

1. The informant’s submission had serious inconsistencies and lack of credibility particularly regarding ownership and development of the concerned app. The informant gave contradictory statements, failed to identify the developer, and did not provide supporting evidence, thereby raising doubts about the veracity of its claims [23];
2. The informant suppressed material facts and made selective disclosure, including: (a) failure to disclose reinstatement of the first account; (b) omission of complete e-mail correspondence with Google; (c) non-disclosure of a third developer account; and (d) contradictory statements made before other authorities;
3. Google had already reinstated the informant’s first account, thereby granting the core relief sought. The informant, however, failed to resubmit its applications (apps) even after reinstatement of its account, weakening its grievance;
4. The CCI rejected the allegation that the impugned app - “Pobreflix - Series, Movies”, for which the informant’s first account was terminated, continued to exist on the Play Store, as the apps currently available had different nomenclature and were not the same as the alleged offending app; and
5. The dispute was essentially an individual developer grievance arising out of policy enforcement, and not a competition law issue. Relying on its findings in the Liberty Case, the CCI observed that that such policies and enforcement mechanisms are standard industry practice and not per se anti-competitive.

Accordingly, the CCI held that no prima facie contravention of the Competition Act was established and dismissed the information.

The CCI approved 37 (thirty-seven) combinations in Q4 of FY 2025-26 including 6 (six) deemed approvals for combinations that were filed under the green channel route. Further, the CCI also issued an order relating to gun-jumping. Summary of the noteworthy combinations approved during this period are set out below:

2.1 ORDERS APPROVED UNDER THE REGULAR ROUTE

a. CCI approves Nippon Steel’s acquisition of control over Krosaki Harima Corporation [24]

On January 6, 2026, the CCI approved Nippon Steel Corporations’ (“Nippon”) [25]  proposed acquisition of 53.4% shareholding in Krosaki Harima Corporation (“Krosaki”), resulting in Krosaki becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of Nippon Steel. The proposed combination was notified following the acquisition of Nippon’s existing 46.6% stake in Krosaki.

The CCI observed that the proposed combination did not give rise to any horizontal overlaps between the parties. However, it identified vertical linkages between Krosaki’s upstream activities in: (i) manufacturing refractory products in India; [26]  and (ii) provision of refractory engineering services in India, and Nippon’s downstream activities in manufacturing and sale of steel in India. 

In its competitive assessment, the CCI noted that Krosaki held moderate market shares across refractory product segments, ranging from 0–5% to 30–35% depending on the category, with established competitors such as RHI Magnesita N.V. and Vesuvius India Limited exerting competitive pressure. In the downstream steel market, Nippon’s market share was observed to be in the range of 5–10%, with significant competition from players such as Tata Steel Limited, Steel Authority of India Limited, and Jindal Steel Limited.

The CCI also assessed the likelihood of foreclosure arising from vertical integration. It noted that despite Nippon’s existing minority stake in Krosaki, the current customer-supplier relationship between the parties was limited. Nippon procured refractory products from multiple domestic and international suppliers, indicating a lack of dependence on Krosaki. This, coupled with the presence of alternative suppliers and customers in both upstream and downstream markets, reduced the likelihood of any ability or incentive to foreclose competition.

In light of the above, the CCI concluded that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved the same under the provisions of the Competition Act.

b. CCI approves acquisition of controlling stake in RBL Bank by Emirates NBD Bank [27]

On January 20, 2026, the CCI approved Emirates NBD Bank (P.J.S.C)’s (“ENBD”) [28]  proposed acquisition of a controlling stake in RBL Bank Limited (“RBL”). The proposed combination envisaged ENBD acquiring between 51% and 74% of RBL’s shareholding through a combination of: (i) an open offer of up to 26% of RBL’s expanded voting share capital; (ii) a preferential allotment of equity shares representing up to 60% of RBL’s total paid-up equity share capital; and (iii) the merger of ENBD’s Indian banking operations into RBL on a going-concern basis.

The CCI identified horizontal overlaps between the parties across several segments of banking services in India, namely: (i) provision of loans and lending services (including wholesale lending); (ii) provision of deposit taking services; (iii) provision of digital payment services; (iv) provision of foreign exchange services; and (v) provision of trade finance services. 

However, no vertical or complementary linkages were observed between the business activities of the parties.

In its competition assessment, the CCI noted that the combined market share of the parties across the above identified markets remained low, i.e., in the range of 0–5%, except in one sub-segment where it was in the range of 5–10%. The CCI further observed that these markets were characterised by the presence of several established players, indicating a competitive landscape.

In light of the above, the CCI concluded that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved the same under the provisions of the Competition Act.

c. CCI approves Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Limited’s acquisition of additional stake in Apollo Health and Lifestyle Limited [29]

On January 20, 2026, the CCI approved Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Limited’s (“Apollo Hospitals”) [30]  proposed acquisition of an additional 30.58% shareholding in Apollo Health and Lifestyle Limited (“Apollo Health”). Pursuant to the proposed combination, Apollo Hospitals’ shareholding in Apollo Health would increase from 68.84% to 99.42%, resulting in near ownership and control.

The CCI observed that the parties exhibit horizontal overlaps in the broad markets for: (i) healthcare services, (ii) diagnostic services, and (iii) telemedical consultation services, in India [31].

In addition to horizontal overlaps, the CCI also examined vertical and complementary linkages between the parties. 

Vertical relationships were noted in areas such as: (i) online doctor appointment booking (upstream) and telemedical consultations (downstream); (ii) diagnostic services (upstream) and healthcare services (downstream); (iii) wholesale and distribution of pharmaceutical products (upstream) and healthcare services (downstream); and (iv) wholesale and distribution of pharmaceutical products (upstream) and diagnostic services (downstream).

Complementary linkages were observed between Apollo Hospital’s: (i) digital platforms for booking doctor appointments and diagnostic and (ii) insurance distribution services, and Apollo Health’s healthcare and diagnostic offerings.

In its competitive assessment, in terms of horizontal overlaps, the CCI noted that the incremental market share resulting from the proposed combination was minimal, in the range of 0–5% across all relevant markets and segments. The combined market share of the parties remained moderate, generally within 0–10% across most segments and geographies, with slightly higher shares, i.e., 10–15%, observed only in limited instances such as pathology services in a single city. 

With respect to vertical and complementary overlaps, the CCI observed that the parties lacked the ability and incentive to foreclose competition in any relevant market. Accordingly, no competition concerns were identified arising from such linkages.

In light of the above, the CCI concluded that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved the same under the provisions of the Competition Act.

2.2 GUN-JUMPING ORDER

a. The CCI penalizes Allcargo Logistics penalised for failing to notify acquisition of sole control over Gati Express [32]

On January 8, 2026, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 50,00,000 (approximately USD 50,730) on Allcargo Logistics Limited ("Allcargo") for consummating a notifiable combination prior to filing notification to and receiving approval from the CCI.

The proceedings arose from Allcargo’s acquisition of a 30% stake in Gati-Kintetsu Express Private Limited ("Gati Express") [33]  from: (i) KWE-Kintetsu World Express (S) Pte. Ltd; and (ii) KWE Kintetsu Express (India) Private Limited, (collectively "KWE") ("ImpugnedTransaction"). Prior to the Proposed Transaction, Allcargo's subsidiary, Allcargo Gati Limited ("AGL"), held 70% of Gati Express, while KWE held the remaining 30%. Accordingly, the Proposed Transaction, which was concluded on June 8, 2023, resulted in Allcargo owning 100% of Gati Express, directly or indirectly.

The CCI, having come across information in the public domain regarding the consummation of the Impugned Transaction, directed AGL to furnish information and documents relating to the Impugned Transaction. Upon examining AGL’s response, the CCI formed a prima facie view that the Impugned Transaction was notifiable, as it resulted in a change of control over Gati Express from joint control of Allcargo and KWE to sole control of Allcargo. Accordingly, the Impugned Transaction could not be considered as being covered under Item 2 of Schedule I of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011 (“Combination Regulations, 2011”), [34]  and a show cause notice was issued to Allcargo on January 9, 2025.

In response to the show cause notice as well as a subsequent oral hearing, Allcargo submitted that:

1. AGL had exercised decisive control over Gati Express even prior to the Impugned Transaction, and accordingly, no change in the degree of control had occurred as a result of the Impugned Transaction;
2. KWE functioned purely as a financial investor without any direct engagement in policy-making or executive functions, as reflected in its voting pattern at board and shareholder meetings over the preceding three years;
3. While KWE technically had the ability to block special resolutions under the Companies Act, 2013 (“CA 2013”), Allcargo held a bona fide belief that it exercised sole control, given KWE's conduct in practice;
4. The change in "quality of control" in the operative standard, per Allcargo was negligible and consistent with the CCI's own decisional practice; and
5. No AAEC resulted from the Impugned Transaction, and there was no deliberate intent to circumvent the filing requirements.

The CCI, after considering Allcargo’s submissions, held that:

1. KWE held not only negative control by virtue of its 30% shareholding, sufficient to block special resolutions under CA 2013, but also contractual veto rights over reserved matters under Gati Express’ shareholders agreement, all of which constituted control-conferring rights;
2. The Impugned Transaction effected an explicit change from joint control to sole control, rendering it notifiable and outside the ambit of Item 2 of Schedule I of the Combination Regulations, 2011;
3. Allcargo's arguments regarding absence of AAEC were misplaced, since AAEC assessment is a separate exercise conducted post-notification and cannot serve as a basis for determining whether a notice ought to have been filed with the CCI.

However, considering the facts and circumstances of the matter and the conduct of Allcargo during the proceedings, the CCI ultimately only imposed a penalty of INR 50,00,000 (approximately USD 50,730).