The Sentinel – The Quarterly News Bulletin In Competition Law (July - Septemebr 2026)

We’re back with a fresh edition of ‘The Sentinel’ - CMS INDUSLAW’s quarterly chronicle of all things competition law. From significant decisions of the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) to important developments before the High Courts, this edition captures the pulse of India’s evolving competition ecosystem.

And for those short on time, a distilled and delightful reckoner of key developments from the second quarter (“Q2”) of the financial year (“FY”) 2026-27 (July- September) awaits in the flowchart below. 

1.1 Decisions of the high court

a. Madhya Pradesh High Court upholds the CCI’s jurisdiction to investigate allegations of market allocation and bid-rigging in relation to the country liquor tender process [1]

On September 17, 2026, the Madhya Pradesh High Court (“MPHC”) dismissed a batch of writ petitions filed by commercial distilleries engaged in the manufacture, rectification, bottling, and wholesale supply of country liquor exclusively within Madhya Pradesh (“Petitioners”). [2]  The proceedings arose from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (“CAG”) audit report on the Revenue Sector of the Government of Madhya Pradesh for FY 2016-17, which flagged that the same distilleries had repeatedly emerged as the lowest bidders in identical districts, with narrow price variations, in tenders floated by the Madhya Pradesh Excise Department between FY 2012-13 to FY 2016-17. Based on the report, the CCI formed a prima facie opinion of bid-rigging and market allocation and directed the Director General, CCI (“DG”) to investigate 8 distilleries. The DG subsequently conducted a detailed investigation, including search and seizure operations and examination of State Excise officials.

Aggrieved, the Petitioners challenged the CCI’s jurisdiction before the MPHC, contending that the State Legislature had exclusive legislative competence over intoxicating liquor, including its production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale, and  that the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 (“Excise Act”) and the rules framed thereunder comprehensively governed these activities. [3]  Further, the CCI, being a statutory authority, could not encroach upon the State’s exclusive excise framework. Additionally, the Excise Act contained mechanisms to address collusive bidding and that, consistent with the Hon’ble Supreme Court (“SC”) judgement in Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Limited [4]  (“Bharti Airtel Case”), the Excise Department was the sole statutory sectoral regulator. Thus, the CCI could not intervene before the sectoral regulator had examined the matter.

Accordingly, the MPHC held that:

1. The Competition Act, 2002 (“Competition Act”) and the Excise Act operate in distinct fields. While the state authorities established under the Excise Act retain regulatory control over the licensing, manufacture and sale of intoxicants, the CCI has the jurisdiction to determine whether an agreement or conduct has an appreciable adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”). Further, unlike telecom framework considered in the Bharti Airtel Case, the Excise Act did not establish any independent regulatory authority to examine anti-competitive practices or their impact on competition, which gives exclusive domain to the CCI to examine such matters.
2. The Petitioners’ argument that the CCI could not rely on the CAG report until the legislative assembly tabled it, is without merit. The CCI did not treat the CAG report’s findings as conclusive, it merely relied on the findings as the basis to direct the DG to investigate the alleged contravention.
3. The Petitioners had participated in the CCI’s proceedings for a substantial period, including seeking extensions and cross-examination, and approached the MPHC only after the DG had submitted its investigation report. Any jurisdictional challenge should have been raised at an earlier stage. Furthermore, a statutory appellate remedy was available before the NCLAT.

Accordingly, the MPHC dismissed all the writ petitions and directed the CCI to complete its inquiry and pass an appropriate final order. 

1.2 Decisions by the CCI

In Q2 of FY 2026-27, the CCI issued a total of 22 orders in relation to enforcement matters. Of these, the CCI: 

1. Passed 5 orders, finding contravention of the provisions of the Competition Act;
2. Declined to investigate 16 information relating to allegations of abuse of dominance and anti-competitive agreements; and
3. Recalled its direction to investigate and closed the inquiry in 1 matter.

A summary of the noteworthy cases is set out below:

a. CCI penalises HP India and its network of resellers for bid-rigging, denies full immunity to HP India, the first-in leniency applicant. [5]

On July 13, 2026, the CCI, by way of 2 separate orders, imposed an aggregate penalty of approx. INR 138.98 crore (approx. USD 14.63 million) [6] on HP India Sales Private Limited (“HP India”), in addition to nominal penalties on HP India’s network of resellers, for bid-rigging in Government e-Marketplace tenders relating to personal systems and supplies products. Notably, although HP India was the first lesser-penalty applicant and made disclosures that assisted the CCI in uncovering the anti-competitive conduct, the CCI did not grant full immunity to HP India, taking into account, inter alia, its role in devising and facilitating the cartel. The CCI also clarified that: (i) an OEM and its resellers may be treated as competitors where they participate in the same tender, and (ii) an OEM may incur liability for facilitating coordination among competing resellers even where it does not itself participate in the relevant tenders. Additionally, a cartel facilitator, even if not acting as a participant of the cartel, could be examined and penalised under Section 3(1) of the Competition Act. [7]  For a detailed analysis of the orders and their implications for the leniency regime, please see our earlier article here.

b. CCI penalises Agro-associations for boycott of online agri-input platform [8]

On August 21, 2026, the CCI penalised Agro Input Dealers Association (“AIDA”) and Agro Input Welfare Association (“AIWA”) (AIDA and AIWA are collectively referred to as “Agro-associations”), along with a cease-and-desist direction and other behavioural directions, for orchestrating a boycott of ‘AgroStar’, an online platform for sale and distribution of agri-inputs [9] , operated by Ulink Agritech Private Limited (“Ulink”). [10]  Ulink filed an information alleging that the Agro-associations pressured the agri-input manufacturers and dealers to stop supplying agri-input products to AgroStar and other online platforms [11] , and threatened retail stores into terminating their AgroStar dealerships [12] , thereby limiting the channel of supply and distribution of agri-inputs and hindering the growth of technology-driven players like Ulink. Accordingly, the CCI formed a prima facie opinion that the Agro-associations’ indulged in practices that limited or controlled the supply and distribution of agri-input products and hindered the development of technology based innovative players. Hence, the CCI directed the DG to investigate the matter.

The DG found substantial evidence corroborating the boycott, including: (i) communications from the Agro-associations encouraging members to support a complete boycott of online sales; (ii) evidence of pressure on dealers to stop supplying online platforms by threatening non-cooperation, resulting in dealership cancellations; and (iii) misleading communications regarding the legality of sale of agri-inputs through online platforms.

The CCI agreed with the DG’s findings and held, inter alia, that:

1. AIDA’s letter to agri-input manufacturers [13]  (“AIDA Letter”) effectively communicated a decision to boycott online platforms, including AgroStar. The Agro-associations had separately raised concerns with Government authorities about spurious agri-input products being sold via online platforms. While this would not amount to a violation of the Competition Act by itself, the Agro-associations’ coordinated communications to manufacturers and retailers went beyond advocacy and sought to control their commercial decisions.
2. AIDA, being the national association representing agri-input dealers, acted as the principal platform through which the boycott campaign was initiated. Further, AIWA actively participated in the implementation of the boycott campaign within the State of Gujarat. The evidence, including dealership cancellations, discontinuation of supplies, communications from market participants and admissions by office bearers, showed that the Agro-associations implemented the boycott in the market rather than merely proposing it.
3. The AIDA Letter resulted in: (a) significant decline in the number of new retail stores being opened; (b) an increase in store closures; and (c) a decline in repeat transactions during the relevant period. Thus, the Agro-associations’ arguments that the boycott had no competitive impact merely because overall market supply had not declined or there was no product shortage in the market are not tenable. 

Accordingly, the CCI held that the Agro-associations limited or controlled the supply and distribution of agri-input products and hindered the development of technology based innovative players by collectively boycotting online agri-input platform. Hence, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 0.81 lakh (approx. USD 851) on AIDA and INR 3.92 lakh (approx. USD 4,129) on AIWA. [14]  Finally, the CCI directed the Agro-associations to organise competition compliance training programmes and submit compliance reports.

c. CCI penalises tyre makers’ agents for bid-rigging, finds no contravention by JK Tyre and CEAT [15]

On August 21, 2026, the CCI penalised Rekha Agencies and SS Marketing, the authorised representatives of J.K. Tyre & Industries Limited (“JK Tyre”) and CEAT Limited (“CEAT”), respectively, for bid-rigging in a 2013 tender floated by Himachal Road Transport Corporation for tyres of various specifications (“HRTC Tender”), while finding no contravention by JK Tyre and CEAT.

The case arose from a reference filed by the State of Haryana through its Director of State Transport, Haryana, concerning its 2018 online tender for tyres (“Haryana Tender”). It alleged that JK Tyre emerged as the sole bidder on 3 occasions despite the presence of several other tyre manufacturers, quoted significantly higher prices than the previous year’s approved rates and declined to lower its price when asked. Accordingly, the CCI formed a prima facie opinion that JK Tyre had indulged in bid-rigging and ordered the DG to investigate. The DG's investigation was extended to 7 other tyre manufacturers (including CEAT) and later to Rekha Agencies and SS Marketing. The DG found, inter alia, that:

1. In the HRTC Tender, Rekha Agencies and SS Marketing exchanged the bid prices of JK Tyre and CEAT, respectively, before the bids were submitted, and the prices ultimately quoted in their submissions were identical;
2. In the Haryana Tender, JK Tyre’s bid prices rose significantly compared to the previous year, without a commensurate increase in production costs. Additionally, it’s bid prices rose across all State Transport Undertakings (“STUs”) tenders examined, suggesting possible collusion;
3. The exchange of pricing information and other sensitive data evidenced coordination between JK Tyre and CEAT through their authorised representatives, Rekha Agencies and SS Marketing (which functioned as extensions of JK Tyre and CEAT). Hence, all 4 had indulged in cartelisation by bid-rigging.  [16]

Interestingly, the CCI found no contravention by JK Tyre, CEAT, and their key managerial personnel, but held, inter alia,  that:

1. The exchange of commercially sensitive bid prices between Rekha Agencies and SS Marketing amounted to bid-rigging as it compromised the independence of the bidding process, distorted competitive conditions and resulted in AAEC;
2. The conduct of the authorised representatives could not, on the evidence available, be attributed to JK Tyre or CEAT. The record disclosed: (a) no direct communication between the officials of JK Tyre and CEAT; and (b) no evidence that their key managerial personnel participated in, approved or knew of the email exchanges between Rekha Agencies and SS Marketing;
3. In the Haryana Tender, even though JK Tyre was the sole bidder, the investigation did not uncover any evidence indicating coordination between JK Tyre, CEAT or any other tyre manufacturer. JK Tyre’s price increases, unaccompanied by any evidence establishing collusion, could not by themselves establish a cartel contravention. Thus, the CCI found a contravention concerning only the HRTC Tender, and not the Haryana Tender that triggered the reference.

Accordingly, the CCI held that Rekha Agencies and SS Marketing indulged in bid-rigging. It passed a cease-and-desist direction and imposed a nominal penalty of: (a) INR 1.30 lakh (approx. USD 1,368) on Rekha Agencies and INR 6.40 lakh (approx. USD 6,737) on its managing director; and (b) INR 2.13 lakh (approx. USD 2,245) on SS Marketing. [17] 

d. CCI issues a cease-and-desist order to Trustees’ Association of India and 3 of its members for cartelisation [18]

On September 2, 2026, the CCI found the Trustees’ Association of India (“TAI”), IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (“IDBI Trustee”), Axis Trustee Services Limited (“Axis Trustee”), and SBI CAP Trustee Company Limited (“SBI CAP”) (together, TAI and these debenture trustees (“DTs”) are the “Defendants”), guilty of cartelisation by collectively fixing minimum fees for debenture trusteeship services (“DT Services”) in FY 2020-21 and FY 2021-22. 

Muthoot Finance Limited (“Muthoot”) filed an information alleging that TAI had prescribed minimum fees for DT Services, which its members could not undercut. According to Muthoot, when it proposed to issue secured non-convertible debentures worth INR 982 crore (approx. USD 103 million) in August 2021, IDBI Trustee quoted fees several times higher than its earlier pricing, stating that TAI had fixed the revised fee structure and that deviation from it would result in adverse repercussions. While the CCI did not find any prima facie abuse of dominance, as the market was fragmented with no single dominant trustee, it directed the DG to investigate allegations of cartelisation by directly / indirectly determining prices. [19]

The DG found, inter alia, that: (i) TAI had fixed a minimum fee structure for DT Services (“Benchmark Pricing”), which the members were expected to follow; and (ii) sanction measures were prescribed for members who did not follow fixed minimum fees for DT Services. 

Relying on TAI’s minutes of meetings, [20]  the CCI held, inter alia, that:

1. The Defendants’ contention that the Benchmark Pricing was merely a non-binding recommendation, and that no sanctions mechanism existed, was untenable. The TAI actively monitored compliance, threatened punitive action for deviations, and misled DTs into believing it could impose penalties for non-conformity, although it had no enforceable power to do so. The absence of such power did not diminish the coercive effect of these threats.
2. The argument that SEBI had mandated collective Benchmark Pricing was also untenable. While SEBI required the DTs to disclose their minimum fees and the factors determining them, the CCI found nothing in the sectoral framework, including the SEBI’s May 2019 circular, [21]  requiring or authorising the TAI to prescribe a uniform minimum fee on behalf of its members. [22]
3. The Benchmark Pricing was intended to prevent the DTs from charging below a prescribed threshold, irrespective of their costs. The collective fixing and enforcement of Benchmark Pricing prevented the DTs from making independent commercial decisions and reduced effective choices for the issuers. By requiring members and non-members to adhere to the Benchmark Pricing, including instances of asking the DTs to not quote lower prices, the Defendants limited and controlled the provision of DT Services, which resulted in AAEC.

Accordingly, the CCI held that the Defendants indulged in cartelisation by fixing the Benchmark Price for provision of DT Services. However, the CCI only passed a cease-and-desist direction without imposing any monetary penalties on account of certain mitigating factors. [23] 

e. CCI closes abuse of dominance proceedings against Google following statutory ban on real money gaming [24]

On September 8, 2026, the CCI closed abuse of dominance proceedings against: (i) Google LLC; (ii) Alphabet Inc.; (iii) Google India Private Limited; and (iv) Google India Digital Services Private Limited (collectively, “Google”). By way of background, Winzo Games Private Limited (“Winzo”) had filed an information alleging that: (i) under its pilot programme [25]  Google did not allow real money gaming (“RMG”) applications, (apart from 2 types of applications, i.e. Daily Fantasy Sports (“DFS”) and Rummy), to be hosted on its Play Store, compelling such applications to rely on sideloading, restricting their user base and visibility; [26]  (ii) Google’s advertisement platform (“Google Ads”) permitted advertisements only for DFS and Rummy applications, to the exclusion of other RMG applications, thereby limiting marketing opportunities for these applications; and (iii) Google displayed warnings flagging payments to Winzo through Google Pay as ‘risky’ or unusually high, without any stated criteria for triggering them. 

At the prima facie stage, the CCI observed that Google holds a dominant position in 3 relevant markets, i.e.,: (i) the market for licensable Operating Systems (“OS”) for smart mobile devices in India; (ii) the market for app stores for Android smart mobile OS in India; and (iii) the market for online search advertising services in India. Further, the CCI observed that permitting only DFS and Rummy under the pilot programme, while excluding other RMG applications, could distort competition by denying market access to competing RMG developers. Given the network effects in app-store markets, the CCI also noted that the prolonged operation of the selective pilot programme could significantly disadvantage non-DFS and non-Rummy RMG applications and create a 2-tier competitive landscape. Separately, the CCI raised concerns regarding Google’s restrictions on advertising through Google Ads, observing that its pivotal role in the digital advertising ecosystem meant that arbitrary restrictions could limit the market visibility and development of excluded RMG applications. Accordingly, the CCI formed a prima facie opinion that Google had abused its dominant position by selectively permitting only DFS and Rummy applications on Google Play, restricting access to Google Ads for other RMG applications, and thereby potentially denying competing RMG developers market access and visibility.

While the DG’s investigation was pending, Google filed a commitment application proposing to open Google Play and Google Ads to RMGs beyond DFS and Rummy. The CCI found Google’s initial proposals unsatisfactory because they failed to address the ads policy and payment-warning concerns. [27]  Thereafter, Google filed another revised commitment application and proposed to: (i) allow distribution of RMGs on Google Play that are self-declared and third-party-certified as permissible games of skill, subject to compliance with applicable laws and Google's policies; and (ii) permit such certified games of skill to advertise through Google Ads, subject to separate third-party certification for advertising purposes and compliance with Google Ads policies. The CCI found prima facie that Google’s revised commitment application addressed the CCI’s concerns and invited objections from Winzo, the DG, and the public.

However, during the pendency of the commitment proceedings, the Parliament enacted the Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025 (“OGA”), which came into force on May 1, 2026. [28]  The OGA, inter alia, prohibited: (i) offering or facilitating online money games; (ii) advertisements promoting online money games; and (iii) facilitating payments relating to online money gaming services. Accordingly, the CCI held that:

1. There was no longer a lawful RMG market on Google Play or Google Ads in which Google could selectively admit some RMGs while excluding others. The reliefs originally sought by Winzo, such as requiring Google to permit all RMG applications or advertisements, could no longer be granted because doing so would itself contravene the OGA.
2. Google’s commitment proposal could no longer be implemented because it was premised on the assumption that legally permissible RMGs could be distributed and advertised. Following the statutory prohibition, that assumption no longer held.
3. While Winzo’s withdrawal of the information did not, by itself, require closure - as proceedings under the Competition Act are inquisitorial and in rem, and Winzo is not the dominus litis - it indicated that Winzo no longer sought individual or interim relief. 

Accordingly, the CCI exercised its power to recall its prima facie order and closed the investigation while reserving its right to take cognisance if the relevant provisions of the OGA cease to operate and Google engages in the alleged conduct again.

CMS IndusLaw View: This order demonstrates the CCI’s growth into a mature regulator which is equipped to take a nuanced and holistic approach to complex matters. Not only did the CCI take into account the statutory ban on RMGs which made its proceeding infructuous and closed the matter, saving the parties from protracted legal proceedings. It was also mindful of the fact that the validity of the OGA is under challenge before the Supreme Court of India, and accounted for a potential change in the legal position by reserving its right to revisit the conduct if the OGA ceases to operate and the conduct resumes. 

The CCI approved 30 combinations in Q2 of FY 2026-27 including 4 deemed approvals for combinations that were filed under the green channel route. Further, the CCI also issued an order relating to gun-jumping. Summary of the noteworthy combinations approved during this period are set out below:

2.1 Orders approved under the regular route

a. CCI approves the merger of Go Digit Infoworks Services Private Limited into Go Digit General Insurance Limited [29]

On July 28, 2026, the CCI approved the proposed combination involving the amalgamation of Go Digit Infoworks Services Private Limited (“Infoworks”) with Go Digit General Insurance Limited (“Digit General”) pursuant to a Scheme of Amalgamation among Infoworks, Digit General and their respective shareholders, with Digit General as the surviving entity. FAL Corporation (“FAL”), a joint notifying party, currently holds 48% of the equity share capital of Infoworks, which in turn is the holding company of Digit General holding 72.17% of its equity shares. Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited (“Fairfax Financial”) is the controlling entity of FAL. [30]

The CCI noted that the proposed combination did not involve any horizontal overlaps. However, the CCI identified certain vertical linkages:

1. Digit General is engaged in the provision of general insurance products and services in India (upstream), and Fairfax Financial (through its affiliates) is engaged in distribution of general insurance products and services in India (downstream).
2. Digit General is engaged in the provision of general insurance products and services in India (upstream), and Fairfax Financial (through its affiliates) is engaged in the provision of reinsurance services in India (downstream).

The CCI observed that the market share of Digit General in the upstream market, and market share of Fairfax Financial in downstream markets, was in the range of 0-5% respectively, both in terms of volume and value.

Additionally, CCI identified a complementary linkage consequent to Digit General’s presence in the travel insurance market and Fairfax Financial’s presence in the market for provision of travel-related services in India through its affiliates. The market share of Digit General and Fairfax Financial was noted to be in the range of 0-5% in terms of volume and value, in their respective markets.

Accordingly, the CCI concluded that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved it.

b. CCI approves multi-step restructuring involving InterGlobe and Accor group entities [31]

On August 5, 2026, the CCI approved the combination jointly proposed by InterGlobe Enterprises Private Limited (“IGE”), InterGlobe Hotels Private Limited (“IGH”), AAPC India Hotel Management Private Limited (“AAPC India”), Triguna Hospitality Ventures (India) Private Limited (“Triguna”), Srilanand Mansions Private Limited (“SMPL”), Techpark Hotels Private Limited (“Techpark”), Accent Hotels Private Limited (“Accent”), Caddie Hotels Private Limited (“Caddie”), AAPC Singapore Private Limited (“AAPC Singapore”), and Mr. Rahul Bhatia, (collectively, the “Notifying Parties”), envisaging the following steps:

1. Step 1 — Mr. Rahul Bhatia (who holds 91.08% of IGE on a fully diluted basis [32] ) acquires 23.2% share in AAPC India); [33]
2. Step 2 — IGE acquires a hotel in Gurgaon from IGH;
3. Step 3 — AAPC India, Triguna, Caddie, SMPL, Techpark, and Accent merge into IGH; and
4. Step 4 — following the merger, IGE and AAPC Singapore invest funds into IGH.

AAPC Singapore is wholly owned and controlled by Accor S.A. (“Accor”), the ultimate holding company of the Accor group. IGE is owned and controlled by the Bhatia family group. IGH, AAPC India, Triguna, and Caddie, are jointly owned and controlled by the Bhatia family group and the Accor group, and, together with their respective affiliates, constitute the target group (“Target Group”). For the purposes of the overlaps assessment, the CCI assessed the business activities of the standalone affiliates of the Bhatia family group (i.e., excluding the Target Group) and the standalone affiliates of the Accor group, each vis-à-vis the Target Group in India. [34]

The CCI identified horizontal overlaps between the Accor group and the Target Group in the market for the provision of hotel accommodation services in India (“Hotels Market”), which can be further segmented based on star-rating of the hotels. Certain Notifying Parties were engaged in the provision of 4-star hotel accommodation services in India (“4-Star Hotels Market”) and exhibited horizontal overlaps in the cities of: (i) Bangalore; (ii) Indore; (iii) Raipur; (iv) Kochi; (v) Gurgaon; (vi) Nashik; and (vii) Lucknow. The combined market share of the parties in both these markets was in the range of 0-5%. Further, in these cities even considering both live and under construction hotels also, the combined market share of the relevant parties was in the range of 5-10%, except in one city, where the combined market share was in the range of 0-5%. The Hotels Market was also characterised by the presence of several market players.

The CCI also identified certain vertical overlaps between: (i) AAPC India, engaged in the Hotels Market (upstream), and the Accor group, through its affiliates, engaged in the provision of travel services in India (downstream); and (ii) IGH, Triguna, and Caddie, along with their respective affiliates, engaged in the market for development of hotel commercial real estate in India (upstream), and the Accor group, through its affiliates, engaged in the Hotels Market (downstream).

Lastly, the CCI identified complementary linkages between the Bhatia family (through an affiliate), engaged in: (i) the provision of hotel consultancy and interior turnkey services in India; (ii) the provision of air transportation services in India ("Air Transportation Market"); and (iii), together with the Accor group (through their respective affiliates), the provision of data processing services in the hospitality sector in India, on one hand, and IGH, AAPC India, SMPL, Techpark, Accent, and Caddie (along with their respective affiliates), engaged in the Hotels Market, on the other hand.

In respect of these vertical and complementary linkages, the CCI found the respective market shares to be largely insignificant (except for InterGlobe Aviation Limited’s 55-60% share in the Air Transportation Market) and concluded that parties had no ability and/or incentive to foreclose competition. Accordingly, the CCI opined that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved it.

c. CCI approves acquisition of 75% equity shares of Bharti Life Insurance by Prudential Corporation Holdings Limited [35]

On August 18, 2026, CCI approved the proposed combination between Prudential Corporation Holdings Limited (“Prudential”) and Bharti Life Insurance Company Limited (“Bharti Life”). Pursuant to the combination, Prudential would acquire an aggregate 75% equity shares of Bharti Life from BLV and the 360 ONE sellers.

Prudential belongs to the Prudential plc Group (“Prudential Group”), whose ultimate controlling entity is Prudential plc. [36]

The CCI noted horizontal overlaps between the Prudential Group and Bharti Life in the market for provision of life insurance in India (“LI Provision Market”). The CCI also identified a vertical linkage between Bharti Life, engaged in the provision of life insurance in India (upstream), and an affiliate of the Prudential Group, engaged in the distribution of life insurance in India (downstream). No complementary linkages were identified between the parties.

The CCI observed that the combined market share of the Prudential Group (including its affiliates) and Bharti Life in the LI Provision Market was in the range of 5-10%, with an increment of less than 1%. The LI Provision Market was also characterised by the presence of several well-positioned players, such as Life Insurance Corporation of India, SBI Life, HDFC Life, Axis Max Life and Tata AIA Life. With respect to the vertical linkage, the CCI found the respective market shares of the parties to be insignificant.

Accordingly, the CCI held that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved it.

d. CCI approves acquisition of 23% equity shares of TM International Logistics Limited by Tata Steel Limited [37]

On August 18, 2026, the CCI approved Tata Steel Limited’s (“Tata Steel”) proposed acquisition of 23% of the equity shares of TM International Logistics Limited (“TMILL”) from IQ Martrade Holding Und Management GmbH (“IQ”). TMILL is a joint venture of Tata Steel, IQ, and NYK Holdings (Europe) B.V. in the ratio 51%, 23%, and 26%, respectively. Pursuant to this acquisition, Tata Steel’s shareholding in TMILL would increase from 51% to 74%. [38]

The CCI identified horizontal overlaps between certain activities of the parties in the market for the provision of bulk cargo shipping services in India. The CCI also identified vertical linkages between TMILL’s activities in the markets for the provision of: (i) railway cargo transportation services in India; [39 ] (ii) port operation services in India; [40]  and (iii) freight forwarding services in India, which comprises the narrower sub-segment of sea-freight forwarding and air-freight forwarding services (upstream); and Tata Steel’s (including its affiliates) demand for these services (downstream). 

In its competitive assessment, CCI noted that the combined market share of the parties in all the identified markets was the range of 0-5% with insignificant incremental market share and the presence of various competitors. The CCI further observed that, the acquisition did not materially alter the existing economic relationship between the parties or the competitive dynamics in the aforesaid markets. 

Accordingly, the CCI held that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved it.

2.2 Gun-jumping order

a. CCI penalises Lloyds Metals and Energy Limited for gun-jumping [41]

On September 8, 2026, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 15 lakhs (approx. USD 0.016 million) on Lloyds Metals and Energy Limited (“LMEL”) for giving effect to part of a proposed combination prior to the CCI’s approval. The combination comprised: (i) LMEL acquiring 79.82% of Thriveni Earthmovers and Infra Private Limited (“TEIL”) and certain additional investors acquiring the remaining 20.18% shares; [42] ; (ii) demerger of Thriveni Earthmovers Private Limited’s (“TEMPL”) [43]  mining development and operations business (“MDO Business”) into TEIL, against issuance of 9.5% redeemable preference shares (“RPS”) to TEMPL shareholders; and (iii) TEIL acquiring 99.83% of Lloyds Surya Private Limited. [44]

LMEL, shortly after signing the Share Subscription Agreement on February 17, 2025, executed a corporate guarantee deed on March 12, 2025 (pending CCI approval) for a principal amount of INR 1,745 crore (approx. USD 198 million) in relation to secured debentures issued by Mahaprabhu Projects Private Limited (“MPPL”). [45]  The guarantee formed part of an arrangement under which LMEL had agreed to provide a corporate guarantee of up to INR 2,500 crore (approx. USD 270 million) towards borrowings by TEMPL’s shareholders or their controlled entities, subject to a counter-guarantee from TEMPL. The CCI initiated gun-jumping proceedings against LMEL for giving effect to part of the proposed combination by providing the corporate guarantee before expiry of the statutory standstill period.

LMEL submitted that the guarantee was merely intended to secure the deferred consideration payable through the RPS and did not give effect to the proposed combination. It argued that: (i) TEMPL’s counter-guarantee eliminated any substantive financial risk; (ii) the arrangement was temporary, reversible and contingent on regulatory approvals; (iii) its role was merely administrative; and (iv) the arrangement did not result in any change in control or alignment of competitive interests. LMEL also relied on CCI’s decision in Ultra Tech Cement Limited [46]  and existing cross-shareholdings between the Lloyds and Thriveni groups.

The CCI rejected these submissions and held that the guarantee and resulting availability of funds to TEMPL’s promoters effectively constituted prepayment or discharge of consideration, rather than security for deferred consideration. The fact that LMEL was protected by a counter-guarantee did not cure the contravention, as the standstill obligation is intended to preserve the parties’ competitive independence and prevent an acquirer from obtaining the economic benefits of a transaction prior to approval. The CCI further held that the arrangement was substantive, rather than merely preparatory or contingent, and that existing cross-shareholdings did not establish that the parties constituted a single economic entity or had identical competitive incentives.

Regarding LMEL’s submission on no change in control, the CCI observed that the absence of a change in control over the MDO Business did not preclude a finding of gun-jumping, as the premature consummation of part of a combination may have an effect similar to that of consummating the entire combination. The CCI also rejected LMEL’s contention that its role was merely administrative, noting that LMEL was to acquire approximately 79% of TEIL and that the consideration for the MDO Business was envisaged to be paid by LMEL.

Accordingly, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 15 lakhs (approx. USD 0.016 million) on LMEL for gun-jumping.