The Sentinel – The Quarterly News Bulletin In Competition Law (April - June 2026)

1.1 DECISIONS OF THE SC

The SC declines to interfere with the NCLAT’s affirmance of CCI’s closure of co-location access allegations against the National Stock Exchange [1]

On May 26, 2026, the SC declined to interfere with the NCLAT order [2] , which had upheld the CCI’s order [3]  dismissing the information [4]  against the National Stock Exchange (“NSE”). The appellant alleged that the co-location facility allowed select brokers to locate trading systems within the NSE premises and access granular 'tick-by-tick' data (including orders, cancellations, modifications, prices, and trades) ahead of other market participants, giving them lower latency and faster execution, distorting market competition. [5] 

   The SC found no reason to interfere with the NCLAT findings, which held that:

1. NSE was dominant in the market for co-location services for algo-trading, but mere dominance is not unlawful - only conduct abusing that dominance with demonstrable appreciable adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”) can be penalised. Co-location was offered to all trading members uniformly on a non-discriminatory, first-come-first-served basis, and availing it was optional; the facility supported the evolution of Direct Market Access [6]  and algorithmic trading toward efficient, error-free execution. The appellant's ‘preferential treatment’ allegation was accordingly without merit.
2. The co-location fees, being uniformly applicable and constituting only a fraction of trading members' overall costs, did not create discriminatory access or entry barriers. While the appellant, not being a trading member, was ineligible to access co-location services, the fact that other eligible trading members chose not to avail themselves of the co-location facility could not amount to discrimination.
3. An effects-based analysis demonstrating AAEC is a mandatory element of any inquiry into abuse of dominant position. Further, dominance achieved through efficiency, innovation or technological advantage is not by itself abusive. The appellant failed to demonstrate any actual harm to competition, consumers, or market structure arising from NSE’s conduct.
4. Since the CCI had formed a reasoned prima facie view after hearing parties and evaluating evidence, it was justified to close the matter at the prima facie stage. 

1.2 DECISIONS OF THE HIGH COURT

Accordingly, the SC dismissed the appeal.

a. The Telangana High Court declines to interfere with the DG investigation report and the CCI’s procedural directions [7] ; the CCI subsequently closes proceedings against AIOCD, affiliated chemist associations, and pharmaceutical companies [8]

The underlying proceedings arose from an information filed in 2012 by the All India Chemists and Distributors Federation (“AICDF”) against All India Organisation of Chemists & Druggists (“AIOCD”) and several pharmaceutical manufacturers, including Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Limited (“DRL”). AICDF alleged that AIOCD compelled pharmaceutical manufacturers' associations to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) requiring No Objection Certificates ("NOCs")/Letters of Cooperation ("LOCs") before appointing stockists, imposed mandatory Product Information Service ("PIS") charges on pharmaceutical companies, and coordinated refusal-to-deal and boycott practices through its affiliated associations against manufacturers that did not comply with these requirements.

Accordingly, the CCI directed the Director General (“DG”) to investigate the matter. This investigation was stayed by the Karnataka High Court from 2012 to 2022 [9] . After the stay was lifted, the DG submitted its report, which found DRL, AIOCD, and other pharmaceutical manufacturers guilty of cartelisation. [10]

Subsequently, DRL filed a writ petition before the High Court of Telangana (“THC”) challenging: (i) the DG report; and (ii) CCI’s consequential order dated May 31, 2024 [11] directing DRL to file objections to the DG report (“Consequential Order”). DRL had argued that the DG report wrongly found it liable despite: (a) its conduct being coerced by AIOCD; (b) the report being vitiated by over a decade of delay; and (c) the absence of a judicial member at the CCI.

On June 10, 2026, the THC dismissed DRL’s writ petition and held that:

1. The Consequential Order was purely procedural in nature, directing filing of objections and financial statements as part of an ongoing inquiry. As it recorded no finding of contravention, imposed no penalty, and did not determine any right or liability of DRL, the order was not amenable to interference.
2. The THC relied upon the SC’s ruling in Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (“CCI v. SAIL”) [12]  whereby it was held that an investigation order (under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 (“Competition Act”)) is administrative in nature and does not determine rights or liabilities, and by parity of reasoning, a procedural direction (under Section 26(8) of the Competition Act) merely calling for objections to a DG report is equally non-adjudicatory.
3. The 60-day period for the DG report is not a rigid limitation, and the CCI (General) Regulations, 2024 [13]  (“General Regulations”) itself contemplates extensions for sufficient cause. The THC noted that a substantial part of the 12-year delay was attributable to the Karnataka High Court’s decade-long stay. Therefore, the delay did not render the DG report or the proceedings void.
4. The challenge pertaining to the absence of a judicial member could not be examined at this stage, as it pertained to the validity of the CCI's statutory framework and required a separate vires challenge. Further, DRL's delay of 12 years in raising the issue, having participated in the proceedings without demur, was indicative of dilatory intent. The THC accordingly kept this question open for adjudication before the appropriate forum.

Accordingly, the THC dismissed the writ petition. Thereafter, the CCI considered AIOCD and other pharmaceutical manufacturers, including DRL’s, submissions on merits, and on June 29, 2026, held that:

1. The DG had relied predominantly on correspondence from 2009–2012 while overlooking the AIOCD's 2014 compliance undertaking confirming that NOC/LOC requirements, mandatory PIS charges, trade margin fixation, and boycott practices had been discontinued. No subsequent breach of the undertaking was established.
2. Several pharmaceutical companies had appointed stockists without obtaining NOCs, and the DG had not examined stockists to establish that appointments were refused for want of NOCs. Similarly, while mandatory PIS charges could raise competition concerns, the evidence did not establish that PIS approval was a compulsory precondition for launching products.
3. There was no consistent evidence of coordinated refusal-to-deal or boycott, and several pharmaceutical companies expressly denied experiencing any such conduct. Further, there was no evidence to establish that the MoUs between the AIOCD and the pharmaceutical manufacturers' associations continued to operate after their termination in 2011.
4. The foundational facts necessary to invoke the presumption of cartelisation were not established, and the DG had also failed to undertake an independent AAEC assessment.

Accordingly, the CCI held that no case of contravention was made out against AIOCD, affiliated associations, and the pharmaceutical manufacturers. Thus, the CCI closed the matter.

b. The Orissa High Court quashes the CCI’s investigation against Rungta Mines for want of a valid investigation order and violation of natural justice [14]

On May 22, 2026, the Orissa High Court (“OHC”) allowed a writ petition filed by Rungta Mines Limited (“Rungta”), challenging the DG investigation initiated against it and its impleadment as an opposite party, on the ground that the CCI had not passed a valid investigation order. 

The proceedings originated from a complaint filed before the Central Bureau of Investigation ("CBI"), alleging cartelisation by nine steel manufacturers in Tamil Nadu, which did not include Rungta. The CBI forwarded the complaint to the CCI, which registered the matter as a suo motu case, directing the DG to investigate. However, Rungta was not named in the original complaint before the CBI but was brought within the scope of the inquiry only during the course of the DG's investigation after the DG searched Rungta's premises and summoned its employees in December 2022. Rungta discovered only in August 2025 that it had, in fact, been treated as the opposite party by the DG. Aggrieved, Rungta filed a writ petition before the OHC.

The OHC clarified that its findings were confined to the jurisdictional facts necessary to trigger a DG investigation and did not extend to the merits of the allegations. As such, the OHC, inter alia, observed that: 

1. The suo motu cognizance of the matter was in response to a Madras High Court [15]  (“MHC”) order dated July 29, 2021, passed in separate proceedings, directing the DG to proceed and take action “in accordance with law”. The MHC's order could not substitute the CCI's independent statutory obligation to form and record a prima facie opinion. The CCI's reliance on the MHC's order as amounting to a mandamus to investigate was a “fatal error”.
2. Consequently, the investigation was vitiated for want of a prior investigation order recording the CCI's prima facie opinion qua Rungta, as mandated in CCI v. SAIL. The CCI's minutes disclosed neither consideration of the complaint nor independent application of mind. Further, the DG had exceeded its statutory mandate by including Rungta within the scope of the investigation, absent any specific CCI direction to that effect, as neither the original complaint, the MHC's order, nor the CCI's own minutes made any reference to Rungta.
3. Rungta's impleadment as an opposite party directly by the DG, without notice violated the principles of natural justice. While an investigation order is administrative in nature, designation as an opposite party entails civil and reputational consequences. Relying on MRF Ltd. v. CCI, [16]  it held that an entity must know the capacity in which it is proceeded against.
4. The petition was neither delayed nor premature, as the cause of action arose only upon Rungta's discovery of its impleadment on August 11, 2025.

1.3 DECISIONS OF THE NCLAT

a. The NCLAT sets aside CCI’s order penalising Grasim for abuse of dominance in the VSF market, remands for a fresh show-cause on points of departure from the DG report [17]

On May 5, 2026, the NCLAT set aside the CCI's order [18]  imposing a penalty of INR 301.61 crore (approx. USD 31.75 million [19] ) on Grasim Industries Ltd (“Grasim”) and issuing behavioural directions for abuse of dominant position in the ‘market for supply of Viscose Staple Fibre ("VSF") to spinners in India’ (“CCI Penalty Order”).

The DG found that Grasim had engaged in discriminatory pricing and imposed supplementary obligations on its customers but rejected the informant’s other allegations and held that: (i) Grasim's non-disclosure of its pricing policy was not itself unlawful; and (ii) that Grasim owed traders no obligation to sell VSF to them. 

However, the CCI’s final order directed Grasim to publicly disclose a transparent and non-discriminatory discount policy and remove end-use restrictions on buyers, departing from the DG’s findings without first putting Grasim on notice or affording it an opportunity to be heard. Grasim challenged the order on procedural grounds.

The NCLAT found that the CCI had departed from the DG's findings without first putting Grasim on notice or affording it an opportunity to be heard. As such, the NCLAT, inter alia, observed that:

1. The CCI cannot record findings beyond the scope of the DG's investigation without following principles of natural justice. Where the CCI proposes to differ from the DG's findings or issue adverse directions on issues in respect of which the DG has found no contravention, it must first disclose the specific grounds of disagreement to the affected party and afford it a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
2. Although the statutory show-cause requirement was introduced after the CCI Penalty Order and was therefore inapplicable to the present case, it merely codifies the principles of natural justice recognised and settled in earlier appellate decisions, by which the CCI is bound.

Accordingly, the NCLAT remanded the matter to the CCI for fresh consideration after granting Grasim an opportunity to be heard.

b. The NCLAT upholds the CCI’s closure of information alleging abuse of dominance by Kerala State Beverages Corporation in the liquor procurement market [20]

On May 20, 2026, the NCLAT dismissed an appeal filed by the Confederation of Indian Alcoholic Beverage Companies (“CIABC”) and the Association of Distillers, Brewers and Vintners of India (“ADBVI”) against the CCI's order dismissing an information [21]  alleging abuse of dominant position by Kerala State Beverages (Manufacturing and Marketing) Corporation Limited (“KSBC”) in the market for wholesale procurement and distribution of branded alcoholic beverages in Kerala.

The appellants had alleged that KSBC, as the exclusive statutory purchaser of liquor in Kerala, abused its dominant position through unilateral price fixation, arbitrary and one-sided tender clauses, discriminatory cash discounts, preferential treatment of Travancore Sugar and Chemicals Ltd. (“TSCL”) [22] , and unjustified deductions for unloading charges. The CCI found no prima facie case of abuse of dominance and closed the matter without directing a DG investigation. Aggrieved, CIABC filed an appeal before the NCLAT.

The NCLAT found no infirmity in the CCI's order and held that: 

1. CIABC failed to furnish concrete data, substantiating its claim of a mismatch between cost increases and price increases. The continued, regular supply by manufacturers undercut the claim of unviability, and no evidence of any manufacturer's exit from the market was produced.
2. The regulated nature of the liquor sector and the linkage of pricing to state taxes and levies justified KSBC's approach to price-fixing on a cost basis.
3. CIABC was given the opportunity to furnish comparative data on other rum brands against TSCL's 'Jawan Rum' to substantiate its preferential-treatment allegation, but it did not furnish any such data either at the hearing or in its written submissions. 
4. The differential cash discounts (approximately 7% to 22%) between fast-moving and slow-moving brands were commercially justified as they partly offset distribution costs, and the CIABC had not shown that it resulted in actual losses or discriminatory treatment.
5. The CCI is not required to conduct a detailed adjudicatory or evidentiary exercise at the prima facie stage, and the informants bear a corresponding duty to furnish complete and substantiated information.

Accordingly, the NCLAT dismissed the appeal.

1.4 DECISIONS BY THE CCI 

In Q1 of FY 2026-27, the CCI issued a total of 29 orders in relation to enforcement matters. Of these, the CCI: 

1. Passed 2 orders, finding contravention of the provisions of the Competition Act;
2. Directed the DG to investigate 5 matters; 
3. Declined to grant interim relief in 2 matters; 
4. Declined to investigate 7 information relating to allegations of abuse of dominance and anti-competitive agreements; and
5. Disagreed with the DG’s findings of contravention and closed 13 investigations.

A summary of the noteworthy cases is set out below:

a. The CCI initiates an investigation against Venkateshwara Hatcheries Group for alleged vertical restraints [23]

On April 1, 2026, the CCI initiated an investigation against Venkateshwara Hatcheries Group (“VH Group”) based on an information filed by People for Animals alleging that the VH Group, through its Broiler Breeder Agreement and Layer Breeder Agreement (“Breeder Agreements”), imposed restrictive conditions prohibiting the contract breeders from distributing their own products, including by restricting the breeders from selling commercial chicks and hatching eggs to ‘unauthorised persons’, overseas buyers and competitors and dealers of competing breeds, thereby amounting to exclusive supply and distribution arrangements. [24]  The Informant also alleged abuse of dominant position by the VH Group.

The VH Group submitted that the informant is barred by limitation and the principle of res judicata from relying on evidence that the CCI had already considered in an earlier matter (“NECC Matter”) [25] , that certain issues raised were sub judice before the SC, and that the informant failed to demonstrate any AAEC, including market foreclosure, consumer harm, or restriction of technical or scientific development. 

While the CCI, prima facie, opined that the aspect of VH Group’s dominance did not require further examination at this stage, in relation to the alleged vertical restraints, it observed that: 

1. The present case is distinct from the NECC Matter as the NECC Matter was against National Egg Coordination Committee (“NECC”) and Agrocorpex India Ltd. and concerned allegations of cartelisation, whereas the present matter is directed against the VH Group and involves a different set of allegations of abuse of dominance and vertical restraints.
2. The Breeder Agreements are standard-form agreements containing one-sided clauses that restrict the breeders from selling commercial chicks and hatching eggs to unauthorised persons and from dealing with competing breeds of parent stock. These clauses prima facie amount to exclusive supply and distribution arrangements.
3. VH Group maintains a substantial portion of the overall poultry business by operating in an integrated model and having considerable influence through representation at industry associations (NECC and Bharat Egg Producers Association). VH Group's restrictive territorial allocation and exclusive distribution agreements are likely to, prima facie, cause AAEC by foreclosing the market, restricting breeders' ability to compete, reducing consumer choice, and potentially leading to higher prices of eggs and poultry products. These vertical agreements restrict breeders and can further strengthen the market power of the VH Group. [26]

Accordingly, the CCI found a prima facie case warranting investigation against VH Group and directed the DG to examine the matter.

b. The CCI finds 17 Assam electrical contractors guilty of bid-rigging, issues a cease-and-desist order [27]

On April 7, 2026, the CCI found 17 electrical contractors guilty of bid-rigging in tenders floated by the Assam Police Housing Corporation Limited (“APHCL”) for ‘Internal and External Electrification Works in the Police Station Buildings’ and issued a cease-and-desist order. 

The case was initiated suo motu by the CCI upon receiving a complaint from the Office of the Accountant General (Audit), Assam (“AG Office”). According to the AG Office, an audit was conducted for the implementation of the ‘Mission of Overall Improvement of Thana for Responsive Image Scheme’ pursuant to which the Accountant General (Audit) found that 17 approved vendors had allegedly engaged in bid rigging in the impugned tenders, resulting in higher cost of procurement by at least INR 7.56 crore (approx. USD 0.8 million) to the Government of Assam.

On October 21, 2021, the CCI, prima facie, observed that the bidders appeared to have coordinated their bids through cover bidding and bid rotation, with 16 out of 17 bidders winning at least one tender and securing L1, L2 and L3 positions across different tenders. Further, the CCI noted several indicators of collusion, including L1- bidders quoting: (i) same price for Schedule of Rates (“SOR”) items as mentioned in Assam Public Works Department SOR; and (ii) the same rate as had been estimated by the consultants for non-SOR items, even replicating the errors in consultants' estimates. Further, the CCI noted narrow differences between L1, L2 and L3 bids, and submission of bids using the same public IP address, indicating a ‘meeting of minds’ among the bidders. Accordingly, the CCI ordered the DG to investigate the matter.

Based on the bidding patterns, documentary evidence, Call Data Records (“CDR”), use of common IP address, witness statements and demand draft evidence, the DG concluded that the electrical contractors had engaged in bid-rigging, bid rotation and cover bidding. The DG also identified the proprietors of all 17 entities as liable. As such, the DG, inter alia, observed that:

1. Although there were 17 bidders, almost all bidders followed a uniform pattern of participation indicating bid rotation, with 16 of the 17 bidders winning at least one tender, and OP-17 appearing to act primarily as a cover bidder; 
2. The bidders quoted identical L-1 prices, while L-2 and L-3 bids differed only by fixed multiples. The bidding pattern showed that the difference in price quoted was not due to factors like cost of transportation, tax etc., but only under a scheme of collusive bidding. In fact, the pattern suggested that bids were prepared by a single person/entity on behalf of all the bidders rather than independently;
3. The bidders had blindly replicated errors in the consultants' estimates, including incorrect pricing of diesel generators and solar streetlights, indicating that they were aware of and relied upon the same estimated prices while preparing bids;
4. CDR, witness statements and bidder responses showed that several bidders were in contact during the tender process and had coordinated the submission of bids through common devices and the same IP address;
5. The sequentially numbered demand drafts for tender fees were procured and submitted on behalf of multiple bidders, providing strong corroborative evidence that the bidders had colluded and allocated tenders amongst themselves before bid submission; 
6. Although the bidders claimed to have had no contact with each other, statements recorded on oath revealed that several proprietors were in fact aware of, or acquainted with, other participating bidders, and had been directed to the same cyber cafe by fellow applicants — undermining their claim of independence. CDR further showed that certain bidders were in contact with each other during the bid submission period, corroborating a pattern of coordination; and

The CCI concurred with the DG’s findings and held that all 17 electrical contractors and their responsible individuals guilty of bid-rigging. However, the CCI limited its final order to a cease-and-desist direction alone and refrained from imposing any monetary penalty. This was on account of considering multiple mitigating factors such as the electrical contractors: (i) being first-time offenders; (ii) had participated in e-tenders for the first time; and (iii) were small proprietorships with limited turnover and profits. 

c. The CCI initiates an investigation against Pernod Ricard and its wholesale/retail network for alleged exclusive dealing [28]

On May 4, 2026, the CCI initiated an investigation against Pernod Ricard India Private Limited (“Pernod Ricard”) and 7 other entities in Pernod Ricard’s wholesale/retail network, based on an information alleging, inter alia, bid-rigging in tenders floated by the Department of Excise, Entertainment and Luxury Tax (“Excise Department”) for the grant of license for wholesale supply of country liquor in the National Capital Territory of Delhi for the year 2022-23. The informant further alleged that:

1. Two bid participants had intentionally disclosed their financial rates which is not only in violation of the tender conditions but also a collusive practice, due to which, the said tender was cancelled, and a fresh tender was issued. However, the participants colluded in successive tenders by quoting prices within an unusually narrow range, leading to cancellation of the subsequent tenders in 2022 on grounds of suspected cartelisation and bid-rigging. Further, they continued to coordinate their bids in the third tender by increasing quoted prices by a similar percentage, indicating concerted action in determining bid prices and allocating tenders; 
2. The repeated participation of the same limited set of bidders in country liquor tenders indicated bid-rigging among the participants. The participants used the platform of International Spirits and Wines Association of India (“ISWAI”) to coordinate the appointment of wholesalers, enter into exclusive arrangements, and adopt common discount and pricing strategies, thereby restricting competition.
3. Pernod Ricard colluded with Indo Spirits Private Limited (“Indo Spirits”) and select retailers by providing financial assistance, preferential discounts and rebates, and coordinating stock allocation to increase its market share while disadvantaging competing retailers [29] . 
4. The executives of Pernod Ricard, United Spirits Limited (“Diageo”), Indo Spirits and Brindco Sales Private Limited (“Brindco Sales”) coordinated litigation strategy and commercial arrangements, while multiple retailers operated through common IP addresses on the Excise Supply Chain Information Management System portal.

While the CCI found insufficient evidence in relation to allegations of bid rigging [30]  and cartelisation [31] , it prima facie held that the allegations relating to Pernod Ricard’s financial support, corporate guarantees, and preferential arrangements with select wholesalers and retailers warranted examination as possible exclusive dealing agreement. As such, the CCI, inter alia, observed that: 

1. Pernod Ricard’s financial assistance to selected retailers, coupled with arrangements encouraging retailers to prioritise Pernod Ricard’s brands, could distort supply and demand, foreclose competing brands, restrict consumer choice and amount to an exclusive dealing arrangement. 
2. The alleged relationships between wholesalers and retailers [32] , such as wholesalers acquiring retail licences through proxy ownership, preferential sourcing, and concentration of wholesale supply created a risk of concentration, thereby leading to exclusive arrangements and brand pushing which has the effect of stifling competition.

Accordingly, the CCI directed the DG to initiate an investigation against Pernod Ricard, Indo Spirits, Pathway HR Solutions, Universal Distributors, Khao Gali, Bubbly Beverages, Shiv Associates and Organomix Ecosystems (including the role of individuals), while removing the remaining participants from the proceedings due to lack of substantiated allegations.

d. The CCI closes proceedings against 12 private Delhi-NCR based super-speciality hospitals over alleged abuse of dominant position [33]

On May 21, 2026, the CCI closed abuse of dominance proceedings against Max Super Specialty Hospital, Patparganj, Delhi (“Max”) and 11 other super-specialty hospitals [34] . By way of background, the information had alleged that Becton Dickinson India Pvt. Ltd. (“Becton”), a manufacturer of disposable syringes, had colluded with Max to print a higher ‘MRP’ on syringes sold through Max's in-house pharmacy than on the same product sold in the open market. 

The DG’s investigation did not reveal any evidence of collusion but observed that Max had abused its dominant position by compelling in-patients to procure products exclusively from its in-house pharmacy. The CCI had affirmed the DG’s findings regarding the lack of evidence of collusion or any anti-competitive agreement and exonerated Becton. However, the CCI observed that the DG's report had, without adequate investigation, flagged conduct akin to ‘aftermarket abuse’ and directed a supplementary investigation into the matter.

The DG: (a) expanded the supplementary investigation to cover 12 super-specialty hospitals in Delhi; (b) delineated 12 separate relevant markets (one for each hospital); (c) found each hospital to be dominant in its respective market; and (d) concluded that all 12 hospitals had abused their dominant position by charging excessive prices for room rent, medical tests, medical devices, consumables, and medicines. 

The CCI held that:

1. DG’s 12 separate-markets approach is incorrect. The patients undergoing elective treatment are generally able to estimate and compare the overall cost of treatment before admission and retain the ability to choose among competing hospitals. Further, they are not prevented from switching hospitals without incurring prohibitive switching costs. Accordingly, an aftermarket does not exist in the present case [35] . The relevant market ought to be delineated as “the market for provision of healthcare services by super-speciality hospitals in Delhi-NCR”.
2. The DG failed to establish excessive pricing under the two-limb test laid down in United Brands v. Commission of the European Communities [36]  (“United Brands”), i.e., whether: (i) the price is, in relation to cost, ‘excessive’; and (ii) the price charged is unfair either in itself or when compared with competing products. 
3. The DG's benchmarking methodology was flawed as comparisons of hospital room charges with hotel accommodation, diagnostic charges with standalone laboratories, and medicines and consumables with procurement prices were inappropriate. They failed to account for the integrated nature of hospital services, including clinical infrastructure, round-the-clock operations, inventory management, and other operational costs. Further, there was no evidence that medicines or consumables had been sold above their MRP.
4. Healthcare services must be assessed as an integrated offering. The patients approach hospitals for medical treatment rather than for individual products or services such as medicines, consumables, or diagnostic tests in isolation. Therefore, the pricing of these components could not be assessed independently of the broader healthcare services provided by the hospitals.

As neither limb of the United Brands test was satisfied, the CCI held that abuse of dominance had not been established and accordingly closed the matter.

e. The CCI initiates an investigation against Mrs. India for alleged abuse of dominance and vertical restraints [37]

On June 2, 2026, the CCI initiated an investigation against Mrs. India Inc. (“Mrs. India”) based on an information [38]  alleging abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive vertical restraints in relation to its beauty pageant competition for married women. The informant alleged that Mrs. India compelled participants to purchase expensive training packages, demanded additional payments for participation in international events and related activities, and required participants to sign standard-form agreements containing onerous and one-sided terms only after substantial payments had already been made. [39]

The informant further alleged that these contractual restrictions amounted to anti-competitive agreements by foreclosing competition, denying market access to competing beauty pageant organisers, and creating barriers to entry. Additionally, the informant claimed that Mrs. India had entered into a cartel arrangement with the international organiser of the ‘Mrs. Globe’ competition by allegedly pre-deciding winners based on monetary payments, thereby rendering the competition collusive and anti-competitive. 

The CCI, while rejecting the allegations of cartelisation [40] , prima facie held that:

1. The impugned agreements could not be examined under cartel provisions as they are in the nature of a vertical relationship as Mrs. India and the informant being present at different levels of production chain. However, the clauses restricting participants from joining competing beauty pageants and mandating association with social causes approved by Mrs. India appeared to constitute tie-in arrangements and exclusive dealing, warranting further examination.
2. The CCI delineated the relevant market as the “market for services of beauty pageants for married women in India for sending winners to major international beauty pageants.” Mrs. India appeared to enjoy a dominant position owing to its exclusive licences for several leading international beauty pageants, international franchise holdings, national reach, media and public visibility, longevity and frequency of editions etc.
3. Several clauses in the impugned agreements appeared onerous and exploitative, including restrictions on participating in competing pageants for five years, mandatory approval for professional assignments, compulsory association with social causes designated by Mrs. India,and may amount to abuse of dominance. Further, these conditions were disclosed only after participants had registered or paid mandatory fees, depriving them of an informed choice.

The informant also sought interim relief, including a stay on the restrictive clauses of the impugned agreements and protection from being restrained from participating in other competitions, on the ground that she continued to suffer irreparable losses as the agreements barred her from earning independently. The CCI decided to consider this application separately.

Accordingly, the CCI found a prima facie case warranting investigation against Mrs. India and directed the DG to investigate the matter. 

f. The CCI penalizes Odisha Truck Associations for cartelization, defers penalty computation [41]

On June 9, 2026, the CCI found 4 truck associations [42]  in Odisha guilty of fixing and revising freight rates for transportation of mineral-carrying goods carriages. According to the information filed by Indian Steel Association:

1. Freight Rate Fixation: the trucking associations collectively fixed and periodically revised freight rates for transportation of mineral-carrying goods at levels exceeding the maximum rates prescribed by the State Government. As such, they issued their own freight rate charts and compelled truck owners to register with them and adhere to the prescribed rates. These practices allegedly increased transportation costs for steel manufacturers, resulting in higher input costs and ultimately higher steel prices for consumers;
2. Market Access Restrictions: the trucking associations disallowed independent transporters to transport raw materials by permitting only registered member trucks to transport minerals from mines; and 
3. Higher-capacity Trucks Restrictions: the trucking associations restricted the use of higher-capacity trucks by permitting only 6 and 10-wheeler trucks despite government notifications increasing permissible carrying capacities, thereby increasing logistics costs and limiting transportation efficiency. 

The DG concluded that the evidence gathered during the investigation substantiated the alleged conduct, except for the restrictions on higher-capacity trucks. In particular, the DG found that the freight rate fixation and market access restrictions amounted to cartelisation.

The CCI held the trucking associations guilty of cartelization and, inter alia,observed that:

1. The Freight Rate Fixation constituted collective price determination [43] ;
2. The trucking associations’ contention that the State Government prescribed rates did not reflect actual costs is untenable given that any decision to determine freight rates must be taken independently by individual transporters and not collectively through associations [44] ; 
3. The Market Access Restrictions, which prevented independent transporters from transporting raw materials from mines, amounted to limiting and controlling the market for transportation services;
4. The trucking associations’ contention that the registration requirement was merely for operational efficiency is untenable given that such practices cannot be used as a means to exclude competitors or restrict entry into the market.
5. The informant did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that the trucking associations’ had collectively imposed Higher-capacity Trucks Restrictions, as there was no material demonstrating any agreement or coordinated practice in this regard.

Accordingly, the CCI issued a cease-and-desist order against the trucking associations and deferred the decision on monetary penalties until receipt of their financial details, while warning that any recurrence of the conduct would attract stricter consequences.

The CCI approved 41 combinations in Q1 of FY 2026-27 including 4 deemed approvals for combinations that were filed under the green channel route. Further, the CCI also issued an order relating to gun-jumping. Summary of the noteworthy combinations approved during this period are set out below. Notably, the SC set aside a INR 201 crore penalty on Amazon.

2.1 DECISIONS BY THE SC

a. The SC sets aside INR 201 crore penalty on Amazon, curbs the CCI's power to reopen an approved combination [45]

2.2 GUN JUMPING ORDERS

On May 27, 2026, the SC allowed Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC's (“Amazon”) appeal and set aside the NCLAT's order dated June 13, 2022, which had upheld the CCI’s penalty on Amazon in connection with its investment in Future Coupons Private Limited but reduced the quantum to INR 201 crore (approximately USD 21 million). The SC, inter alia, held that: (i) the CCI's power to inquire into an approved combination is subject to the statutory limitation under the Competition Act; and (ii) penalties for failure to notify, misrepresentation or suppression require strict satisfaction of the statutory conditions. Accordingly, the SC set aside the penalties in their entirety and directed refund of any amount deposited or recovered from Amazon with interest. For a detailed analysis of the judgment, please see our earlier article here.

a. The CCI penalizes Manipal for consummating acquisition of additional stake in Aakash Educational Services without prior approval [46]

On May 20, 2026, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 50 lakhs (approximately USD 0.06 million) on Manipal Health Systems Private Limited (“MHSPL”) and Manipal Education and Medical Group India Private Limited (“MEMGIPL”) (collectively, “Manipal”) for consummating a notifiable combination without prior notification to and approval from the CCI.

In January 2024, in view of Aakash Educational Services Limited’s (“AESL”) financial distress, MHSPL (a debenture holder of AESL at the time) converted its debentures into an approximate 39.61% shareholding in AESL (“Initial Acquisition”). [47]  Manipal subsequently notified the Initial Acquisition, along with a proposed further acquisition of 8.25% in AESL by MEMG Family Office LLP, an affiliate of Manipal, to the CCI. The CCI approved both in July 2024 (“2024 Approval”), permitting Manipal's cumulative shareholding to reach up to approximately 48%. However, the right to acquire the 8.25% shareholding was not exercised due to ongoing litigation that prevented its completion. 

Following the 2024 Approval: (i) in November 2024, AESL’s shareholders amended its articles of association to grant MHSPL additional governance rights (“AoA Amendment”); (ii) in February 2025, an affiliate of Manipal acquired 7.75% shareholding in AESL from Blackstone group entities in a secondary sale (“Blackstone Acquisition”); and (iii) in April 2025, Manipal acquired a further 11.03% shareholding in AESL from the company's founder (“Notified Transaction”), taking its cumulative shareholding to approximately 58.39%.

Manipal sought CCI approval only for the Notified Transaction, after the it had already been consummated. [48] While approving the Notified Transaction, the CCI issued a show-cause notice, taking the view that, all three transactions, i.e.,  the Notified Transaction, the AoA Amendment and the Blackstone Acquisition, ought to have been notified to, and approved by the CCI, prior to consummation. 

Manipal argued that neither the AoA Amendment nor the Blackstone Acquisition required notification, and it should not be penalized under the gun-jumping provisions of the Competition Act. It submitted that:

1. the additional rights granted did not change the degree or quality of this control or confer any new operational control, pursuant to the AoA Amendment. Further, that Manipal had not exercised these additional rights.
2. since the proposed 8.25% acquisition remained incomplete, Manipal's actual shareholding in AESL stood at approximately 39.61%, qualifying the Blackstone Acquisition for an exemption available to shareholders acquiring incremental shareholding of an entity in which they hold more than 25%, provided such acquisition does not take their shareholding to more than 50% and does not result in a change of control. 
3. if the Blackstone Acquisition were considered notifiable, then the subsequent Notified Transaction would independently qualify for a different exemption available to shareholders who hold more than 50% of an entity in which they are making an incremental acquisition, provided the acquisition does not result in a change of control. 
4. with regard to the Notified Transaction, it acted out of necessity given AESL’s financial distress and the need to protect its students and other stakeholders, and that it had acted in good faith by voluntarily disclosing all three transactions and cooperating fully with the CCI.

ORDERS APPROVED UNDER THE REGULAR ROUTE 

The CCI, relying on the SC’s decision in Thomas Cook, [49]  held that irrespective of the merits of Manipal’s arguments on the AoA Amendment and the Blackstone Acquisition, the consummation of the Notified Transaction before CCI approval was itself sufficient to establish the violation of the gun-jumping provisions. While the CCI treated Manipal's voluntary disclosure and cooperation as mitigating factors, it also noted that this was not Manipal's first gun-jumping violation, since the Initial Acquisition had also been consummated before notification. [50]  Accordingly, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 50 lakhs (approximately USD 0.06 million).

a. CCI approves acquisition of additional stake in Shriram Life Insurance Company Limited by Sanlam Emerging Markets (Mauritius) Limited. [51]

On June 9, 2026, Sanlam Emerging Markets (Mauritius) Ltd. (“SEMM”) secured CCI approval for its proposed acquisition of an additional 2.80% of the expanded equity share capital of Shriram Life Insurance Company Limited (“SLIC”) by way of a preferential issue. [52]  SEMM is an existing shareholder of SLIC, holding a direct stake of 49.25%, and pursuant to the proposed combination, SEMM’s direct holding in SLIC would cross 50% of the expanded equity capital. The notice was initially filed by SLIC in error; the CCI subsequently condoned the error upon SEMM's request and treated the notice as filed by SEMM.

The CCI observed that the proposed combination may lead to a change in degree of control of SLIC while SLIC would continue to be under the joint management and control of the Shriram group and SEMM. It was noted that the change in degree of control does not seemingly cause a change in the competition dynamics in the area of operations of SLIC. 

The CCI noted that the proposed combination did not involve any horizontal overlaps. However, given SEMM’s 40.70% stake in Shriram Capital Private Limited ("SCPL"), a vertical linkage was identified between SLIC’s activity of provision of life insurance (upstream) and the activity of certain SCPL entities engaged in distribution of insurance in India as insurance brokers and corporate agents (downstream). 

The CCI found the parties' combined presence in these markets to be under 1%, insufficient to alter competition dynamics or confer ability or incentive for input/customer foreclosure. Accordingly, the CCI concluded that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved it.

b. CCI approves acquisition of 29.06% share capital of PUMA SE by Ancat Holding GmbH [53]

On June 9, 2026, Ancat Holding GmbH (“Ancat”), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of ANTA Sports Products Limited (“ANTA”),  [54]  secured CCI approval to acquire 29.06% of the issued and outstanding share capital of PUMA SE (“Puma”), by way of a secondary share purchase from Artémis SAS, pursuant to a share purchase agreement. 

ANTA has presence in India through its affiliates which sell ANTA-branded products and certain Wilson and Salomon products to Indian distributors. The CCI identified wholesale/B2B sales of sports goods as an area of horizontal overlap, further segmented into sports apparel, sports footwear, and sports equipment/accessories, with the overlap between the parties narrowed down to sports equipment/accessories, while Puma's presence spanned across all three segments. With regards to vertical linkages, the CCI considered the plausible vertical linkage between the presence of ANTA group entities in the wholesale/B2B segment and presence of Puma in retail segment. 

The CCI noted that for the overlapping segment of sports equipment/accessories, the proposed combination was not likely to cause a significant change in concentration, given the presence of at least three other significant competitors, namely Nike, Adidas, and Decathlon, capable of imposing competitive constraints on Ancat post-closing. For the non-overlapping segments, the CCI similarly noted significant competitive constraints from Adidas and Nike in sports apparel, and from Adidas, Nike, and Skechers in sports footwear. Hence, the proposed combination was not considered likely to cause AAEC in any of the mentioned segments of sports goods in India. Further, the CCI observed that the vertical linkage was not likely to confer on Ancat the ability/incentive to engage in foreclosure strategies.

Accordingly, the CCI concluded that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved it.

c. CCI approves acquisition of Macquarie AirFinance Limited by Dubai Aerospace Enterprise Ltd. [55]

On June 2, 2026, Dubai Aerospace Enterprise (DAE) Ltd. ("DAE") and DAE Eirecam Designated Activity Company, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of DAE (collectively, “Acquirers”), secured CCI’s approval to acquire 100% of the shareholding, and thereby sole control, of Macquarie AirFinance Limited (“MAFL”), pursuant to a share purchase agreement [56]  dated February 26, 2026. [57]

The CCI identified horizontal overlaps between the parties in the broader market for dry leasing of aircraft to airlines worldwide and in India, and in the narrower segment of dry leasing of narrow-body aircraft to airlines worldwide and in India. [58]  While leaving the precise product and geographic market definitions open, the CCI noted that, from a demand-side perspective, airlines operate globally or pan-India and can freely deploy aircrafts across jurisdictions without maintaining a country-specific fleet, while lessors similarly allocate fleet capacity globally without geographic restriction. Accordingly, the CCI assessed competition at both the India and worldwide levels. 

The CCI noted that the combined market share of the parties at the worldwide level in both the broad and narrow dry-leasing markets was in the range of 5-10%, with an increment of 0-5%, while at the India level, the combined market share was 10-15% in the broad market and 5-10% in the narrow market, with an increment of 0-5% in each. The CCI further observed thatestablished competitors such as AerCap Holdings N.V. and SMBC Aviation Capital Ltd. held market shares over 10% in most segments, while other competitors (Avolon Holdings Limited and BOC Aviation Limited) held shares around or over 5%, and would continue to exert strong competitive constraints on the parties

A vertical linkage was also identified between the parties’ upstream activity of dry leasing of aircraft to airlines worldwide and the Acquirer group’s downstream activity of providing air passenger transport services in India through Emirates and flydubai. The CCI observed that the Acquirer group’s market share of 0-5% in the downstream air passenger transport market was too insignificant to change the parties’ incentive or ability to raise any foreclosure concerns.

In light of the above, the CCI concluded that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved it.

d. CCI approves demerger of Bennett Coleman's EIBME business into Times Horizon [59]

On February 17, 2026, the CCI approved the internal reorganisation of Bennett Coleman & Company Limited (“BCCL”) involving the demerger of its education, investment, broadcasting, media and entertainment business (“EIBME Business”) into its wholly owned subsidiary Times Horizon Private Limited (“THPL”), pursuant to a composite scheme of arrangement dated September 22, 2025 and a group reorganisation agreement dated September 23, 2025. Business carried on by BCCL and its group entities can be classified into: (a) the entities, businesses, undertakings, assets and liabilities that carry on the “Publishing Business” [60] ; and (b) the entities, businesses, undertakings, assets and liabilities that carry on the EIBME Business. THPL was incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary of BCCL, and its shareholding will exactly mirror BCCL’s existing shareholding. Upon effectiveness of the scheme, BCCL's Publishing Business would remain with BCCL, while THPL would house the EIBME Business.

Overlaps were identified between BCCL's Publishing Business and THPL’s EIBME Business on account of the change in the nature of voting rights exercised by Bharat Nidhi Limited (“BNL”), one of the notifying parties, [61]  acting in concert with the other Specified Shareholders. Horizontal overlaps were identified in the markets for publication of digital content in India (“Digital Content Market”), with a sub-segment for digital news (“Digital News Segment”), provision of event management services (“Event Management Market”), and supply of digital advertisement space (“Digital Advertisement Market”). Vertical linkages were identified between: (a) THPL’s digital music streaming services (upstream) and BCCL’s aggregation services (downstream); (b) the parties' supply of digital advertisement space (upstream) and BCCL’s media buying services (downstream); and (c) BCCL’s digital display advertising platform services (upstream) and the parties' supply of digital advertisement space (downstream).

The CCI found the combined market share of the notifying parties to be 0-5% across the Digital Content, Event Management, and Digital Advertisement Markets, and 20-25% in the Digital News Segment, with a 0-5% increment throughout. Each of these markets was characterised by the presence of players such as Google India, Meta India, Amazon India, VerSe Innovation, and HT Media Group. Vertical-linkage market shares were similarly 0-5% in each instance, raising no foreclosure concerns.

In light of the above, the CCI concluded that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved it.

e. CCI approves acquisition of certain shareholding by L Catterton India Fund in Haldiram Snacks Food Private Limited [62]

On February 3, 2026, CCI approved the acquisition of certain shareholding by L Catterton India Fund (“LCAT”) in Haldiram Snacks Food Private Limited (“Haldiram”) [63]  pursuant to a share purchase agreement, a deed of accession and an advisory agreement (by way of which L Catterton Mumbai Advisory Services Private Limited (“Advisor”) will receive commercially sensitive information of Haldiram, and may advise it on strategy, talent and performance).

The CCI noted that there are only horizontal overlaps between the activities of the parties in the broad market for manufacture and sale of packaged foods in India, that may be further segmented by products, i.e.:, (a) chocolates, and (b) snacks. The segmentation of snacks may be further subsegment as: (x) salted snacks, and (y) non-salted snacks in India. In its competition assessment, the CCI noted that the incremental market share of the parties in any of the segments is not such as to cause any competition concerns.

Accordingly, and considering the overall competition landscape in each of the aforesaid market segments, the CCI concluded that the proposed combination is not likely to cause any AAEC in India and approved it.