IP Verse: Create. Claim. Control. (July – September 2026)

We are pleased to present this edition of our IP Newsletter, highlighting key developments from the third quarter of 2026.

This period witnessed courts continuing to define the contours of intellectual property protection in an increasingly digital and technology-driven marketplace. Trade mark cases ranged from the restraint on “GODFATHER’S” whisky, with beer and whisky treated as allied and cognate goods, to Jyothy Labs v. Dabur over “NEEM” as a source identifier for toothpaste, while the Telangana High Court called for a “perceptive consumer with informed associations” test in the Sai Silks dispute. Copyright law confronted artificial intelligence directly, with the Delhi High Court applying the fair dealing exception to the training of ChatGPT in ANI v. OpenAI, the Madras High Court restraining alleged AI scraping of travel content, and the Copyright Office refusing to recognise DABUS as an author. Courts also examined copyright strikes and content takedowns on social media platforms and the licensing of television content in hotel rooms. In design law, prior publication proved fatal to Novamax’s cooler design while leaving its passing off claim alive, and Crocs was directed to bear Bata’s litigation costs. The “PISCO” dispute saw the Delhi High Court affirm the coexistence of homonymous geographical indications. In the patent sphere, the Delhi High Court framed guidelines for assessing “mental acts” under Section 3(m), directed Sun Pharma to seek prior approval before launching its semaglutide tablets, and continued to send back unreasoned refusals in matters such as Enviro Ambient and Fresenius Kabi. Collectively, these developments reflect the continued evolution of Indian intellectual property jurisprudence and provide valuable insights on the protection, enforcement, and commercial exploitation of intellectual property rights in an increasingly dynamic marketplace.

We hope you find this edition informative and engaging. Happy reading!

1. Delhi high court restrains use of “GODFATHER” mark on whisky

The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi (“Delhi High Court”), by order dated 22 June 2026, granted an ad interim injunction restraining Cartel Bros. Private Limited and another (collectively, “Cartel Bros.”) from using the mark “GODFATHER’S” for whisky, in a suit filed by Devans Modern Breweries Limited (“Devans”). [1]

Devans, the registered proprietor of the “GODFATHER” mark, claimed continuous use of the mark for beer since 1984 and held registrations in Class 33 for alcoholic beverages, including rum and whisky. The dispute arose when Cartel Bros. proposed to launch a whisky under the name “THE GLENWALK GODFATHER’S BY SANJAY DUTT”. Devans alleged infringement and passing off, while Cartel Bros. argued that the other elements of its composite mark, such as “THE GLENWALK” and “BY SANJAY DUTT”, distinguished it from Devans’ mark.

Referring to Sections 18, 28 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (“TM Act”), [2]  the Delhi High Court held that non-use of a registered mark does not, by itself, deprive the proprietor of its statutory right to enforce the mark, absent rectification or cancellation. It found that beer and whisky were prima facie allied and cognate goods, given their nature, common trade channels and regulatory regime, and that “GODFATHER’S” was a significant component of Cartel Bros.’ composite mark and prima facie deceptively similar to Devans’ registered “GODFATHER” mark. The Delhi High Court accordingly restrained Cartel Bros. from using the impugned mark.

The matter presently remains pending, and the next date of hearing is scheduled for 08 December 2026.

2. Delhi high court grants injunction in “Beauty of Joseon” dispute

The Delhi High Court, by order dated 02 July 2026, granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining Shahnawaz Siddiqui and others (collectively, “Siddiqui”) from using the trade mark and trade dress of GoodAI Global Inc. (“GoodAI”) in relation to its “Beauty of Joseon” products. [3]

GoodAI, the owner of the “Beauty of Joseon” brand, submitted that by a judgment dated 28 January 2025, the Trade Marks Registry had been directed to remove Siddiqui’s registered mark from the Register of Trade Marks, but that Siddiqui had continued to use the impugned mark thereafter. GoodAI further argued that the parties’ products were very similar in terms of their trade mark and trade dress, and, since Siddiqui’s mark no longer stood on the Register, sought protection on the basis of passing off.

Considering GoodAI’s application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), [4]  the Delhi High Court found that GoodAI had established a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience lay in its favour, and that it would suffer irreparable loss and injury if relief were denied.

The Delhi High Court accordingly restrained Siddiqui from using GoodAI’s trade mark and trade dress until further orders, and directed Amazon Seller Services Private Limited (“Amazon”) to de-list the products identified in the plaint and any other URLs notified by GoodAI.

The matter presently remains pending, and the next date of hearing is scheduled for 16 December 2026.

3. Delhi high court lists “SOCIAL HOUSE” and “SOCIAL” trade mark dispute for hearing after unsuccessful mediation

The Delhi High Court, by order dated 08 July 2026, issued notice in an appeal filed by Vardhaman Choksi (“Choksi”), proprietor of the “SOCIAL HOUSE” trade mark, against Impresario Entertainment & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. (“Impresario”), concerning the competing “SOCIAL HOUSE” and “SOCIAL” marks in the hospitality sector. [5]  The appeal challenges a Single Judge’s decision dated 10 April 2026, which cancelled Choksi’s “SOCIAL HOUSE” mark and rejected Choksi’s rectification applications against Impresario’s “SOCIAL” marks.

Choksi contended that he had adopted the “SOCIAL HOUSE” mark in 2011 and had used it commercially in connection with events hosted at his ESCOBAR establishment in Mumbai. He further contended that Impresario had subsequently begun using the “SOCIAL” mark. In the appeal, Choksi argued that the Single Judge had failed to adequately consider the evidence of prior adoption and bona fide use and had erroneously upheld the finding of non-use under Section 47 of the TM Act, despite the rectification proceedings having been initiated within the statutory five-year grace period following registration.

Both parties had agreed to consider settlement; however, the mediation process has since broken down. The matter presently remains pending, and the next date of hearing is scheduled for 04 November 2026.

4. Bombay high court imposes INR 82 lakh costs for breach of “NOVA” trade mark injunction

The Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay (“Bombay High Court”), by order dated 13 July 2026, imposed costs of over INR 82 lakh on Harichand Nagpal (“Nagpal”), proprietor of Ravi Industries, for his wilful violation of an injunction prohibiting the use of Dr. Ashok M. Bhat’s (“Bhat”) registered trade mark “NOVA” and the associated artistic work. [6]  Bhat had initiated contempt proceedings in 2025, alleging that Nagpal had intentionally violated his rights.

The Bombay High Court observed that even after the injunction, Nagpal had continued to sell hair cream products under the names “NONI” and “NOVA MINI”, using artwork substantially similar to Bhat’s registered label. The Court did not believe that the infringing use was inadvertent or due to employee error, and noted that Nagpal was a habitual counterfeiter.

The Court also observed that the sales records of the infringing products had not been fully disclosed and ordered Nagpal to furnish complete details of sales of the infringing products. It ordered Nagpal to pay INR 32.42 lakh towards legal expenses and INR 50 lakh as exemplary costs within four weeks.

5. Delhi high court restrains “n:” and “nu:beat” logos in New Balance trade mark dispute

The Delhi High Court, by order dated 16 July 2026, restrained Astormueller AG and its Indian subsidiaries (collectively, “Astormueller”) from manufacturing, selling, advertising, or otherwise dealing in footwear featuring the standalone “n:” logo, the “nu:beat” logo, or any deceptively similar mark, in a suit filed by New Balance Athletics Inc. (“New Balance”). [7]  The Court held that New Balance had made out a prima facie case of passing off, noting that the letter “n” was the most prominent element of Astormueller’s marks and that the colon device was not enough to distinguish Astormueller’s marks from New Balance’s registered and well-known “N” marks. The Court also took into account the use of the marks by both parties on the same goods through common trade channels, and New Balance’s prior use of the “N” marks in India.

The Court rejected Astormueller’s argument that the suit could not be maintained as both parties were proprietors of registered trade marks, holding that registration does not preclude a passing off action. Holding that the balance of convenience was in favour of New Balance, considering its extensive and prior use of the “N” marks, the Court granted the interim injunction pending disposal of the suit.

The matter presently remains pending, and the next date of hearing is scheduled for 06 October 2026.

6. Delhi high court holds “Uniqueness” is not a test for trade mark registration

The Delhi High Court, by judgment dated 27 July 2026, set aside the Registrar of Trade Marks’ (“Registrar”) order refusing registration of ADS Spirits Pvt. Ltd.’s (“ADS Spirits”) “OFFER” trade mark in Class 33 for alcoholic beverages. [8]  The application had been refused under Section 9(1)(a) of the TM Act on the ground that the mark was devoid of “uniqueness” and that “OFFER” was commonly used in relation to discounts.

The Court held that Section 9(1)(a) requires an assessment of distinctive character, i.e., whether the mark is capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods from those of others. “Uniqueness” is not a statutory requirement for registration. The Court further observed that distinctiveness must be assessed in relation to the goods for which registration is sought. In this case, the Registrar had failed to examine whether “OFFER” was distinctive in relation to alcoholic beverages. The Court also noted that an “offer” and a “discount” are not synonymous.

The Court found the Registrar’s order to be non-speaking and unreasoned, as it failed to consider the submissions and documents filed by ADS Spirits. Accordingly, the order dated 30 October 2025 was quashed and set aside, and the Registrar was directed to reconsider the application after granting ADS Spirits an opportunity of hearing. The appeal was disposed of, with the Court clarifying that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of registration.

7. Delhi high court restrains restaurant from using “LAMA KITCHEN” trade mark

The Delhi High Court, by order dated 20 July 2026, granted an ex parte ad interim injunction in favour of Satinder Singh Sarna and another (collectively, “Sarna”), proprietors of the registered trade mark “LAMA KITCHEN”. [9]  Sarna alleged that Lama Kitchen, a restaurant in Delhi (“Delhi Restaurant”), was operating under the identical “LAMA KITCHEN” mark, offering Tibetan and Chinese cuisine and using the mark on its Instagram page.

The Court noted that the parties operated in the same hospitality sector and catered to a common consumer base. The Delhi Restaurant’s use of the identical mark, including on its Instagram page, was found likely to cause consumer confusion. The Court further noted that the Delhi Restaurant had not been authorised or licensed by Sarna to use the mark and that there appeared to be no plausible explanation for adopting an identical mark for identical services. The Court accordingly found a prima facie case of infringement under Section 29 of the TM Act.

The Court also considered the similarity in the restaurants’ interiors, including the use of Tibetan prayer flags, and held that the manner of use indicated an attempt to create an association with Sarna’s establishment, amounting prima facie to passing off. Accordingly, the Delhi Restaurant was restrained from using “LAMA KITCHEN” or any deceptively similar mark in connection with its restaurant and hospitality services, trade name, email address or social media handles. It was further directed to remove references to the impugned marks from its merchandise, packaging, advertising material and social media platforms within four weeks.

The matter presently remains pending, and the next date of hearing is scheduled for 06 November 2026.

8. Delhi high court grants injunction against rogue websites using “GATI” trade mark

The Delhi High Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction in favour of Allcargo Logistics Limited (“Allcargo”), restraining 36 unknown operators of rogue websites (collectively, “Rogue Operators”) from using the well-known “GATI” trade mark or deceptively similar variants in relation to packing, shifting, and relocation services. [10]  Allcargo alleged that the Rogue Operators were operating websites and domain names incorporating the “GATI” mark and offering competing services while seeking to benefit from the goodwill associated with the mark.

The Court noted that “GATI” was a recognised well-known trade mark and that the Rogue Operators had adopted the mark in its entirety. On this basis, the Court found a prima facie case of trade mark infringement and passing off. The Court also directed the concerned domain registrars to lock and suspend the impugned domain names within 36 hours of receipt of the order.

The matter presently remains pending, and the next date of hearing is scheduled for 03 December 2026.

9. Bombay high court restrains dabur from using “NEEM” as a source identifier for toothpaste

The Bombay High Court, by order dated 13 August 2026, temporarily restrained Dabur India Limited (“Dabur”) from using “NEEM” as the leading and essential feature of its toothpaste label in a trade mark infringement and passing off suit filed by Jyothy Labs Limited (“Jyothy Labs”). The Court, however, clarified that Dabur was not restrained from using “NEEM” descriptively on its label or otherwise. [11]

Jyothy Labs relied on three registered trade marks containing “NEEM” as their leading and essential feature and claimed use of the mark for toothpaste through its predecessor since around 1920. Dabur contended, inter alia, that “NEEM” was generic/descriptive and that its use was protected under Sections 30(2)(a) and 35 of the TM Act.

The Court prima facie rejected Dabur’s contention that “NEEM” was generic for toothpaste, noting that the material relied upon by Dabur showed use of the term across several categories of products rather than as the generic name for toothpaste. It further found that “NEEM” was prima facie suggestive rather than descriptive in relation to toothpaste, since a consumer would have to make an “imaginative leap” to associate the term with the product.

The Court also compared Dabur’s domestic and international packaging and noted that while “NEEM” appeared inconspicuously on the international packaging, it was prominently displayed in large lettering on the domestic label. In the absence of an explanation for this difference, the Court prima facie found that Dabur had consciously used “NEEM” as a source identifier rather than descriptively. It accordingly held that Dabur could not, at this stage, rely on the defences under Sections 30(2)(a) and 35 of the TM Act. The Court further observed that the presence of Dabur’s house mark did not, by itself, eliminate the likelihood of confusion.

Finding that Jyothy Labs had established a prima facie case of infringement and passing off and that the balance of convenience lay in its favour, the Court allowed the interim application and restrained Dabur from using “NEEM” as the leading and essential feature of the impugned label. The operation of the order was subsequently stayed for six weeks, while expressly permitting Dabur to continue using “NEEM” in a descriptive manner.

10. Delhi high court upholds finding of wilful suppression in “REWIREX” trade mark dispute

The Delhi High Court dismissed a review petition filed by the counsel on record for Celagenex Research (India) Private Limited (“Celagenex”) against findings of wilful suppression made in an earlier judgment concerning the “REWIREX” trade mark dispute. [12]  The Court held that filing counsel cannot avoid responsibility for ensuring complete disclosure of material facts and documents by attributing an omission to the client or junior colleagues.

In its earlier judgment dated 20 August 2026, the Court had found that Celagenex failed to disclose a legal notice issued to Nugenesys Pharmaceuticals Private Limited (“Nugenesys”) and objections filed before the Trade Marks Registry, despite both documents being material to the dispute. The Court had consequently vacated the ex parte interim injunction granted in favour of Celagenex and imposed costs on it. The filing counsel sought review of the findings against him, contending that the documents had not been specifically brought to his attention and that the omission was inadvertent.

The Court rejected these contentions, noting that both documents formed part of the papers filed with the plaint, although included under an obscure description. It held that filing counsel, as an officer of the court, has an independent professional responsibility to examine the documents filed with a plaint and ensure complete and accurate disclosure of material facts and documents. Such responsibility could not be shifted to the client or junior colleagues.

The Court also found no basis to reconsider its earlier conclusion that the non-disclosure amounted to wilful suppression. It further held that the filing counsel had no standing, in his personal capacity, to challenge the costs imposed on Celagenex. Finding no error apparent or other ground warranting review, the Court dismissed the review petition and left its earlier findings undisturbed.

11. Delhi high court sets aside refusal of “AYU LIFESCIENCE” trade mark

The Delhi High Court set aside an order of the Trade Marks Registry refusing registration of the device mark “AYU LIFESCIENCE” under Section 11(1) of the TM Act. The Court held that the Registry had relied on cited marks without properly considering their status on the Register and had failed to undertake a proper comparison of the competing marks. [13]

Ayu Lifescience Industries FZE (“Ayu Lifescience”) had appealed against the Registry’s order, which refused its application based on three cited marks in Class 05, namely “AYU” (device), “AYU18” and “AYU SHAKTI”. Ayu Lifescience contended that the “AYU” application had remained objected to and unprosecuted since 2020, while “AYU SHAKTI” was pending opposition. Of the three cited marks, only “AYU18” was registered.

The Court observed that the Registry had treated the cited marks as valid marks on the Register without examining their status or providing reasons for doing so. It further found that the Registry had not properly compared “AYU LIFESCIENCE” with the registered “AYU18” mark and appeared to have focused on the common element “AYU” by dissecting the competing marks, contrary to the anti-dissection rule.

Without expressing any view on the merits of the similarity between the marks, the Court partly allowed the appeal and directed the Registry to reconsider the application afresh, after providing Ayu Lifescience an opportunity of hearing.

12. Madras high court rejects leave to sue in trade mark jurisdiction dispute

The Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Madras (“Madras High Court”) rejected an application filed by Vinbros & Co. (“Vinbros”) seeking leave to institute a trade mark infringement suit before it against Chamundi Winery and Distillery and R.R. Wine Mart (collectively, “Chamundi Winery”). The Court held that the mere registration of a trade mark with the Trade Marks Registry at Chennai was insufficient, by itself, to give rise to a cause of action within its jurisdiction. [14]

Vinbros, a Puducherry-based liquor manufacturer and registered proprietor of the “BLUE GRAPE” trade mark, alleged that Chamundi Winery was using a deceptively similar mark for brandy. It sought leave to sue before the Madras High Court on the basis that its trade mark was registered with the Trade Marks Registry at Chennai, while acknowledging that Chamundi Winery’s products were not being sold in Chennai.

Relying on the Full Bench decision in Duro Flex Pvt. Ltd. v. Duroflex Sittings System [15]  and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) in Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, [16]  the Court held that the situs of the Trade Marks Registry may constitute one of the factors forming the bundle of facts relevant to determining the situs of the cause of action, but cannot independently confer jurisdiction.

The Court further noted that Vinbros had itself acknowledged in the plaint that Chamundi Winery’s products were not sold in Chennai and had not pleaded any other part of the cause of action as having arisen there. Accordingly, the Court rejected the application for leave and directed the plaint to be returned for presentation before the appropriate court.

13. Bombay high court restrains cloud kitchen from using “BARBECUE/BARBEQUE” mark

The Bombay High Court, at its Nagpur Bench, by order dated 01 September 2026, temporarily restrained a cloud kitchen operating as “Barbeque, Gokulpeth” from using the marks “BARBECUE” or “BARBEQUE” in a trade mark infringement and passing off suit filed by Tervinder Singh Jhans and Barbecue Food Services Private Limited ( “Barbecue Food Services”). [17]

Barbecue Food Services claimed use of the “BARBECUE/BARBEQUE” mark for its restaurant at Sadar, Nagpur since 1994. In November 2022, it discovered that Barbeque Gokulpeth was operating a cloud kitchen and supplying food through online food delivery platforms. The district court had refused interim relief, inter alia, on the ground that the parties operated from different locations in Nagpur and that the mark was not exclusively associated with Barbecue Food Services.

The Court disagreed with the district court and observed that “BARBECUE” and “BARBEQUE” were phonetically similar. Relying on the principles governing infringement under Section 29 of the TM Act, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai, [18]  the Court held that the difference in the physical locations from which the parties operated was insufficient to deny interim protection, particularly when Barbeque Gokulpeth was supplying food through online platforms.

Finding that continued use of the impugned mark would cause irreparable injury to the goodwill and reputation of Barbecue Food Services, the Court set aside the district court’s order and restrained Barbeque Gokulpeth, its partners, agents and assigns from using, selling, advertising or otherwise dealing under “BARBECUE/BARBEQUE” or any deceptively similar mark during the pendency of the suit.

14. Telangana high court holds religious names in composite trade marks cannot be monopolised

The Hon’ble High Court for the State of Telangana (“Telangana High Court”) dismissed an appeal filed by Sai Silks (Kalamandir) Limited (“Sai Silks”) seeking interim relief against the use of “KANCHIPURAM VARAHI LAKSHMI SILKS” by SKP B. Gopinath Private Limited and others (collectively, “SKP”). The Court held that registration of a composite label mark confers protection on the mark as a whole and does not confer exclusive rights over its common or non-distinctive elements, including religious names. [19]

Sai Silks relied on its registered marks including “KANCHEEPURAM VARA MAHALAKSHMI SILKS”, “VARA MAHALAKSHMI SILKS KANCHEEPURAM” and “VARA MAHALAKSHMI”, and contended that SKP’s mark was phonetically, visually and structurally deceptively similar. SKP relied on Section 17 of the TM Act, contending that Sai Silks could not claim exclusivity over individual non-distinctive elements of its composite marks.

The Court observed that “Vara Mahalakshmi” and “Varahi Lakshmi” were expressions having religious connotations and held that Sai Silks could not claim proprietary rights over such expressions. Applying Sections 17(1) and 17(2)(b) of the TM Act, the Court further noted that “Kancheepuram”, being a geographical reference associated with silk sarees, and “Silks”, being common to the trade, could not individually confer exclusivity. The Court also compared the competing label marks as a whole and found that their visual dissimilarities outweighed their similarities and negated the likelihood of confusion. It observed that the conventional test of a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection was unsuitable in the context of saree purchases, which ordinarily involve greater awareness of the store, brand and origin. The Court noted that, in the contemporary digital and social media environment, the relevant standard should account for a “perceptive consumer with informed associations”.

Accordingly, finding no likelihood of deceptive similarity between the competing marks, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the refusal of interim relief.

15. Delhi high court restrains Kwick Living’s disparaging advertising campaign against HUL

The Delhi High Court, by order dated 18 September 2026, granted interim relief to Hindustan Unilever Ltd. (“HUL”) against Kwick Living (I) Pvt. Ltd. (“Kwick Living”), restraining Kwick Living from continuing its advertising campaign titled “War on What’s Hidden” in its offending form. [20]  The campaign targeted HUL’s products, namely VIM and SURF EXCEL, by stating that their ingredients included Benzisothiazolinone (BIT) and Linear Alkylbenzene Sulfonate (LAS). HUL contended that the campaign amounted to commercial disparagement, trade mark and trade dress infringement, copyright infringement, passing off and unfair competition.

The Court examined the limits of comparative advertising and when an adverse comparison amounts to commercial disparagement. It reaffirmed that comparative advertising is permissible, and that an unfavourable comparison is not actionable unless it involves falsehood, misrepresentation or deception causing injury. The Court held that an advertisement must be assessed as a whole, rather than by examining individual claims in isolation. Although the claims regarding BIT and LAS were factually correct, the overall campaign, including the reference to HUL’s products and the exhortation to “SWITCH TO BECO”, conveyed the misleading impression that HUL’s products could cause skin irritation, redness, itching or eczema.

The Court, therefore, found a prima facie case, balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable injury in favour of HUL. Kwick Living was directed to remove and recall the advertisements within one week, while being permitted to undertake otherwise lawful comparative advertising.

16. Delhi high court records undertakings by meta, google and WhatsApp in Pulkit Mani’s suit

The Delhi High Court, by order dated 09 September 2026, issued notice on an application seeking an ex parte interim injunction in a suit filed by Pulkit Mani (“Mani”) concerning the removal of content from social media platforms. [21]

Mani sought urgent relief against Meta Platforms Inc. (“Meta”), Google LLC (“Google”), WhatsApp LLC (“WhatsApp”) and other parties. Considering the urgency of the relief sought, the Delhi High Court exempted Mani from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“CCA”) [22]  and issued notice on his application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC.

Meta informed the Delhi High Court that two Instagram URLs forming part of the dispute had been restored, which Mani acknowledged. Meta further undertook to provide basic subscriber information (“BSI”) and IP log details concerning certain parties within two weeks, and to file a compliance affidavit.

Google similarly undertook to provide specified BSI details relating to two Gmail accounts, while WhatsApp undertook to preserve and disclose BSI and account information relating to a specified mobile number. The Delhi High Court directed Meta and WhatsApp to comply with their respective undertakings.

The matter presently remains pending, and the next date of hearing is scheduled for 18 January 2027.

17. Madras high court restrains AI scraping of travel content

The Madras High Court, by order dated 01 July 2026, granted an ad interim injunction in favour of Keshan Infotech Pvt. Ltd. (“Keshan”), operator of www.travelandtourworld.com, restraining the alleged unauthorised scraping and reproduction of its copyrighted travel content, including through artificial intelligence (“AI”) tools. [23]

Keshan alleged that Oliver Brandt (“Brandt”), an Italian editor, had systematically scraped its travel content and republished it on social media platforms, retaining Keshan’s logo while masking original authorship. Justice K. Kumaresh Babu found these allegations prima facie supported by the plaint and Brandt’s own social media posts, and held that the alleged use of proprietary content as training data or prompts for large language models (“LLMs”) raised a prima facie case of copyright infringement warranting immediate judicial intervention.

The Madras High Court restrained the reproduction, translation, summarisation or paraphrasing of Keshan’s content “whether by human authorship or through any automated AI-assisted or algorithmic process”, including its use as training data for any AI model, LLM, automated content generation tool or web scraper. The restraint also extends to automated scraping of Keshan’s website and to the creation of derivative works through AI or other automated means.

The injunction was granted for a period of four weeks, with notice issued to Brandt and the other parties returnable within four weeks and service permitted by speed post.

18. Delhi high court denies ani interim relief against OpenAI; appeal pending

The Delhi High Court, by judgment dated 24 July 2026, dismissed ANI Media Pvt. Ltd.’s (“ANI”) application for an interim injunction against Open AI OpCo LLC (“OpenAI”) in ANI’s copyright infringement suit concerning the training and operation of ChatGPT. [24]

Justice Amit Bansal upheld the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, rejecting OpenAI’s objection that its models were trained outside India. On training, the Court held that OpenAI’s storage and processing of ANI’s works was prima facie protected by the fair dealing exception for private or personal use, including research, under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957 (“Copyright Act”), [25]  and did not amount to infringement under Section 51. On outputs, it found no prima facie evidence that ChatGPT had memorised or regurgitated ANI’s content. Noting the wider public interest in AI development, the Court declined interim relief, clarifying that its findings would not bind the trial.

On ANI’s appeal, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court issued notice to OpenAI by order dated 15 September 2026. [26]  ANI argues that Indian law recognises “fair dealing” rather than the broader American “fair use”, questions whether commercial use at scale by a for-profit developer can qualify as private or personal use, and relies on OpenAI’s licensing arrangements with publishers such as the Financial Times. The Bench deferred any direction on OpenAI’s interim arrangement of not scraping ANI’s website until OpenAI responds.

The matter presently remains pending, and the next date of hearing is scheduled for 05 December 2026.

19. Madras high court restrains reproduction of Rajendra Chola sculpture

The Madras High Court, by order dated 28 July 2026, granted an interim injunction restraining Sudarshan and Amudalingam, proprietors of Amudhu Arts and Murals (collectively, “Amudhu Arts”), from reproducing, copying, adapting, modifying or creating any derivative work of a sculpture of Chola emperor Rajendra Chola I created by artist Ashok Balakrishnan (“Balakrishnan”). [27]

Balakrishnan alleged that he had been called upon to produce a miniature of the statue, which was subsequently installed by the Union of India. He further alleged that, despite his involvement in creating the miniature, the Union of India engaged Amudhu Arts to create larger versions of the same sculpture, including statues of 10 and 20 feet, without engaging his services. Balakrishnan, therefore, sought protection against reproduction of his sculpture and use of his proprietary materials, including sketches, images, renderings, specifications and digital files shared in confidence.

The Madras High Court observed that Balakrishnan had been called upon to produce the miniature and that the same had subsequently been installed, while the Union of India had proceeded to have the larger statue created through Amudhu Arts. Finding this sufficient at the interim stage, the Court granted the injunction as prayed for.

20. Punjab and Haryana high court upholds removal of copyrighted song by Meta

The Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana (“Punjab and Haryana High Court”), by order dated 20 May 2026, disposed of a petition challenging Meta’s removal of a song from a Facebook page, [28]  holding that Meta had acted in accordance with the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (“2021 Rules”). [29]

Maninderjeet Singh (“Singh”) operated a Facebook page titled “Lok Awaz Punjabi”. He asserted that content had been removed pursuant to a private copyright complaint without providing him with an opportunity of hearing under Rule 4(8) of the 2021 Rules. Meta submitted that Singh had uploaded a song belonging to a copyright owner without obtaining the requisite consent and that Meta was required to remove the song upon receiving the copyright owner’s complaint. Meta further clarified that only the song had been removed and that Singh’s Facebook page remained accessible.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court observed that Singh had been duly informed that the song was removed because it had been uploaded without the copyright owner’s consent. Furthermore, Singh had not produced any material disputing this position. The petition was accordingly disposed of, with the Court noting that Meta had removed only the song and not Singh’s page.

21. Calcutta high court requires separate copyright licence for hotel room television content

The Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta (“Calcutta High Court”), by judgment dated 04 August 2026, held that Hotel Appolo & Tours Private Limited (“Hotel Appolo”) was required to obtain a separate licence from The Indian Performing Right Society Limited (“IPRS”) for communicating literary and musical works. [30]

IPRS had challenged the District Judge’s order dated 20 September 2024 refusing an interim injunction. Hotel Appolo contended that it had already paid cable connection charges to the cable operator, who possessed the requisite broadcasting rights, and therefore no separate royalty was payable to IPRS.

The Court examined the definition of “communication to the public” under Section 2(ff) of the Copyright Act, which expressly includes communication through cable to more than one household or place of residence, including residential rooms of a hotel. It further noted that Hotel Appolo’s cable subscription was intended for use by hotel guests, who were not “subscribers” within the meaning of the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 (“Cable TV Act”). [31]

The Court also distinguished the cable operator’s licensed right to broadcast from Hotel Appolo’s commercial use of the works as an amenity for paying guests. It held that such use amounted to commercial exploitation and copyright infringement under Section 51 of the Copyright Act. Finding a strong prima facie case and irreparable injury, the Court set aside the trial court’s order and granted the interim injunction sought by IPRS.

22. Delhi high court examines Meta’s copyright strike mechanism

The Delhi High Court, by order dated 11 August 2026, issued notice in a copyright dispute concerning the way social media platforms suspend accounts pursuant to copyright strikes. [32]

Saurabh Maurya (“Maurya”), a content creator, challenged the suspension of his account by Meta. Maurya asserted that Meta’s standard operating procedure for acting on copyright strikes was inconsistent with the principles laid down in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India [33]  and Myspace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. [34]  Maurya argued that, under the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”) [35]  and the Copyright Act, an intermediary could not suspend an account merely upon receipt of a copyright strike or itself determine whether copyright infringement had occurred.

Meta informed the Court that the copyright strikes had been reversed and Maurya’s account restored. Nevertheless, the Court issued notice and framed the question whether the existing system of suspension, takedown and subsequent deletion of accounts based on copyright strikes is consistent with the settled jurisprudence.

23. Karnataka high court declines writ petition seeking USD 2.5 million copyright damages from eBay

The Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka (“Karnataka High Court”), by order dated 03 August 2026, declined to entertain a writ petition seeking USD 2.5 million in damages from eBay entities for alleged copyright infringement. [36]  Lt. Col. D.K. Havanoor (Retd.) (“Havanoor”) alleged that eBay.com, represented in India by eBay India Pvt. Ltd. (“eBay”), had displayed and offered for sale a book purportedly belonging to him for USD 12.53.

Havanoor claimed that the display and sale of the book constituted infringement of his intellectual property rights and sought USD 2.5 million in damages from eBay. He had also initiated complaints before the Halasuru Police Station.

The Karnataka High Court observed that Havanoor’s grievance essentially concerned alleged copyright infringement by private parties. The Court held that a writ petition seeking a direction to private entities such as eBay to pay USD 2.5 million could not be entertained in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The petition was accordingly disposed of, while reserving liberty to Havanoor to seek redress before a competent court of law, if so advised.

24. Supreme court modifies interim relief in hotel Apollo copyright dispute

The Supreme Court, by order dated 09 September 2026, modified the interim protection granted by it to Hotel Appolo in its challenge to the Calcutta High Court’s judgment concerning copyright licensing for television content provided to hotel guests. [37]

On 20 August 2026, the Supreme Court granted an interim stay after Hotel Appolo contended that it subscribed to a cable operator holding a licence from IPRS. Hotel Appolo also argued that Section 52(1)(k) of the Copyright Act could not extend to individual hotel rooms. It relied on Hotel & Restaurant Ass’n v. Star India (P) Ltd. [38]

However, at the hearing on 09 September 2026, Hotel Appolo stated that its cable operator did not possess an IPRS licence and that the licence had, in fact, been obtained by the broadcaster. The Supreme Court noted that the stay of the Calcutta High Court’s judgment had proceeded on the contrary representation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed Hotel Appolo to deposit INR 12 lakh with the Court and permitted continuation of the interim protection subject to such deposit. It expressly left open whether a cable operator requires an IPRS licence or whether a broadcaster’s licence would suffice.

25. Calcutta high court refuses interim injunction against publisher after years of inaction

The Calcutta High Court, by judgment dated 27 August 2026, refused an interim injunction sought by the authors of two English grammar textbooks, Pares Chandra Das and another (collectively, “Das”), against their publisher, New Central Book Agency Private Limited (“Central Book Agency”). [39]  Das alleged that Central Book Agency’s rights under agreements executed in 2001 and 2002 had expired and that its continued publication constituted copyright infringement. Das relied on Section 19(5) of the Copyright Act, contending that since the agreements did not specify a term, the publication rights were deemed to subsist for five years.

While the Court noted that the five-year period expired in April 2007, it also noted that Das took no steps to restrain publication. The Court further held that a 2020 Co-Publishing Agreement did not amount to novation of the original agreements under Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“Contract Act”). [40]  The continued obligation to pay royalties under the original agreements indicated that those agreements remained operative.

In light of Das’ prolonged inaction and subsequent conduct, the Court found that no prima facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable injury was established and dismissed the application for interim injunction.

26. Madras high court holds copyright disputes between contracting parties arbitrable

The Madras High Court, by order dated 01 September 2026, held that a copyright dispute arising between parties bound by an arbitration agreement could be referred to arbitration, notwithstanding the availability of civil remedies under the Copyright Act. [41]  The matter concerned alleged exploitation of rights over cinematograph films assigned to Eros Technologies Digital FZE (“Eros”).

Eros sought an injunction restraining Ayngaran International Media Pvt. Ltd. and others (collectively, “Ayngaran”) from uploading, streaming, communicating to the public, distributing or monetising the films. One of the entities comprising Ayngaran, however, sought reference to arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause contained in the impugned assignment deed. Eros contended that copyright infringement was a statutory cause of action and therefore non-arbitrable.

The Madras High Court held that the civil remedy under Section 55 of the Copyright Act could also be pursued through arbitration where the parties had agreed to arbitrate.

Finding no prima facie basis to treat the arbitration agreement as null and void, the Court allowed the application seeking arbitration and directed the plaint to be returned.

27. Rajasthan high court holds copyright registration not mandatory for criminal proceedings

The Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench (“Rajasthan High Court”), by order dated 17 August 2026, held that registration of copyright is not mandatory for initiating criminal proceedings for alleged infringement. [42]  Sanjay Bhatt (“Bhatt”) sought quashing of an FIR alleging offences under Sections 63, 63A and 64 of the Copyright Act, alongside offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) [43]  and the TM Act. The dispute concerned the alleged unauthorised sale of “Dandi Salt” / “Dandi Namak” using an imitative trade mark and allegedly infringing copyright. Bhatt argued that the complainant had no registered copyright or trade mark and therefore lacked locus to initiate criminal proceedings.

The Court observed that copyright registration is voluntary and that it is not a prerequisite for enforcement of rights. Whether the complainant possessed copyright in the disputed work was a factual question requiring evidence and could not be conclusively determined in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). [44]  Accordingly, finding that the alleged infringement was actionable under both civil and criminal law, the Court declined to quash the FIR.

28. Copyright office refuses to recognise AI system DABUS as author

The Registrar of Copyrights, Copyright Office, Government of India (“Copyright Office”), by order dated 31 August 2026, rejected an application filed by Dr. Stephen L. Thaler (“Thaler”) seeking registration of an artistic work titled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise”, which named DABUS, an AI system, as its author. [45]

The Copyright Office held that the work satisfied the threshold of originality under Section 13 of the Copyright Act on the material placed on record, and that the use of algorithmic or computational processes does not, by itself, render an expression unoriginal. However, it observed that DABUS is neither a natural nor a juristic person recognised in law and therefore cannot be entered as “author” under Section 2(d)(vi) of the Copyright Act. On Thaler’s own account, having conceived, configured and trained DABUS and supplied the relevant inputs, Thaler was the legally recognised person who caused the work to be created, and therefore the person capable of being identified as its statutory author.

The Copyright Office noted that Thaler had been given an opportunity to amend the author entry in the application but had declined and continued to insist on DABUS as the author. The application was accordingly rejected, with liberty to Thaler to seek fresh registration correctly identifying the author and the corresponding basis of ownership. The Copyright Office clarified that whether legal personhood or authorship should ever be extended to autonomous AI is a policy question for Parliament and cannot be introduced through administrative reinterpretation.

29. Delhi high court rejects Novavax’s design claim, lets passing off proceed

The Delhi High Court, by order dated 19 June 2026, partly allowed an application filed by Prem Appliances under Order XIII-A of the CPC, seeking summary dismissal of a suit filed by Novamax Industries LLP (“Novamax”) alleging infringement of its registered cooler design bearing registration no. 322384-002 and passing off. [46]

The Delhi High Court accepted Prem Appliances’ contention that the suit design had been prior published, since Novamax’s own invoices and website disclosed coolers bearing the suit design, sold under the “ZEPHYR” mark, before the design application was filed on 19 October 2019. This invalidated the registration under Sections 4 and 19 of the Designs Act, 2000 (“Designs Act”). [47]  The Court accordingly held that the infringement claim had no real prospect of succeeding and dismissed that limb.

However, relying on the Full Bench decision in Carlsberg Breweries A/S v. Som Distilleries and Breweries Ltd. [48]  and the Division Bench ruling in Crocs Inc. USA v. Bata India Ltd., [49]  the Court held that a composite suit for design infringement and passing off is maintainable, and that failure of the infringement claim does not by itself defeat a properly pleaded passing off claim, resting on the independent requirements of goodwill, misrepresentation and damage. Finding passing off adequately pleaded in the plaint, the Court directed that claim to proceed to trial.

The matter presently remains pending, and the next date of hearing is scheduled for 27 January 2027.

30. Delhi high court orders crocs to pay INR 24.63 lakh costs to Bata

The Delhi High Court, by order dated 08 July 2026, directed Crocs Inc. USA (“Crocs”) to pay INR 24.63 lakh in litigation costs to Bata India Ltd. (“Bata”), closing a design infringement suit instituted by Crocs in 2014 that had become unsustainable following cancellation of Crocs’ registered footwear design. [50]

Justice Prathiba M. Singh observed that courts had repeatedly held that Crocs’ registered design lacked novelty, and that the Controller of Patents and Designs (“Controller”) had separately cancelled the registration as neither new nor original, given prior publication of the same design. The Delhi High Court had earlier, in February 2018, refused Crocs’ plea for an interim injunction on the same basis, a finding upheld by a Division Bench in January 2019 and left undisturbed by the Supreme Court, which directed that costs would abide by the result of the suit.

Rejecting Crocs’ contention that costs could not be awarded because the July 2023 order disposing of the suit did not expressly grant them, the Court held that mere non-mention of costs in the disposal order did not amount to a waiver. Applying the principles governing costs in commercial litigation laid down by the Supreme Court in Uflex Ltd. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, [51]  the Court recognised Bata as the successful party, which had incurred substantial expenses defending proceedings before the district court, the Delhi High Court, its Division Bench and the Supreme Court, and directed Crocs to reimburse INR 24.63 lakh within three months.

24. Delhi High Court Sets Aside Patent Refusal for Absence of Reasoning on Inventive Step

The Delhi High Court, vide judgment dated 17 April, 2026, allowed an appeal filed by Nippon Steel Corporation (“Nippon Steel”) under Section 117A (2) of the Patents Act, 1970 (“Patents Act”) [29] , setting aside the Controller of Patents’ (“Controller”) order dated 26 May, 2020, refusing patent application no. 10182/DELNP/2012 for a process for the production of grain-oriented electrical steel sheet. [30]

The Controller had refused the application on the ground of lack of inventive step under Section 2(1) (ja) of the Patents Act, 1970 (as amended) citing three prior art documents. However, the impugned order consisted almost entirely of verbatim reproduction of these prior art documents, followed by a bare conclusion that the claims lacked inventive step without any analysis of: (i) the invention disclosed in the prior art; (ii) the invention claimed in the application; or (iii) the manner in which the claimed invention would be obvious to a person skilled in the art.

The Delhi High Court, relying on Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs [31] , held that a refusal on grounds of lack of inventive step must be supported by reasoned analysis of all three elements above, and that a mere reproduction of prior art extracts followed by a conclusory finding cannot constitute the bedrock of such decision. The order was set aside and the application remanded for de novo consideration before a different Controller within four months.

25. Territorial Jurisdiction Essential for Patent Injunctions: HP High Court Vacates Interim Relief 

The Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh ("HP High Court") has vacated an interim injunction granted against Safex Chemicals Private Limited ("Safex") in a patent infringement dispute, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case on territorial jurisdiction. The appeal arose from an order restraining Safex from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or dealing in products alleged to infringe a patent held by SML Limited ("SML") relating to an agricultural formulation marketed under the brand name “Aladdin”. SML had instituted the suit before the HP High Court alleging that Safex and another defendant were marketing infringing products within Himachal Pradesh. To establish territorial jurisdiction, SML relied upon certain invoices purportedly evidencing sales of the impugned product in the State. 

Upon examining the record, the HP High Court found that the invoices had been issued by third parties who were not shown to be authorised representatives of Safex and observed that there was no material demonstrating that Safex had manufactured or commercially exploited the allegedly infringing product within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court.

Holding that interim relief cannot be sustained on the basis of speculative or insufficient jurisdictional facts, the Court vacated the injunction insofar as it operated against Safex. The decision reiterates that in patent infringement actions, a plaintiff must establish a clear territorial nexus with the forum before securing interim injunctive relief. [32]

26. Delhi High Court Resets SEP Standards in Philips Appeal 

The Delhi High Court, in a judgment dated 18 May 2026, allowed appeals filed by K.K. Bansal and Rajesh Bansal and set aside a 2018 decree in favour of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (“Philips”) concerning Indian Patent No. 184753, which Philips had asserted to be a Standard Essential Patent (“SEP”) relating to DVD technology. [33]

Philips had alleged that the defendants infringed its patent by importing components from China and assembling DVD players in India. The Single Judge had earlier held the patent to be an SEP (Standard Essential Patents) and awarded royalties and damages. On appeal, the defendants challenged the patent’s essentiality, the finding of infringement, the royalty calculation methodology, and the rejection of their defence of patent exhaustion.

The Division Bench held that Philips had failed to establish that the suit patent was, in fact, an SEP. The Court found that Philips had not produced adequate claim-mapping evidence linking the patent claims to the relevant DVD standard and had relied heavily on foreign essentiality certificates without examining their authors. It further held that infringement had not been proved through admissible technical evidence. The defendants’ exhaustion defence under Section 107A(b) of the Patents Act, 1970 (“Patents Act”) was also accepted, observing that the relevant components had been sourced through authorised channels. The Division Bench also criticised the absence of a proper FRAND licensing framework and rejected the royalty assessment adopted by the Single Judge.

27. Delhi High Court Confirms Section 3(i) Exclusion Applies Across Full Diagnostic Spectrum in Twin Patent Decisions 

The Delhi High Court, in two decisions delivered between January and March 2026, has provided the most consolidated articulation to date of the diagnostic method exclusion under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970 (“Patents Act”).

In Hirotsu Bio Science INC v. Controller of Patents & Designs [34] , decided 17 January, 2026, Justice Tejas Karia upheld the refusal of a patent for an automated in vitro cancer detection method using the chemotactic behaviour of the nematode C. elegans on urine samples. The Court held that it is immaterial who performs the method, a process does not escape Section 3(i) simply because no physician is involved in operating it.

In Geron Corporation v. Controller of Patents & Designs [35] , decided 17 March, 2026, Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora upheld the refusal of a patent for an in vitro method of selecting cancer patients for telomerase inhibitor treatment based on telomere length measurement. Setting out twelve consolidated principles, the Court held that a method falls within Section 3(i) if it is inherently capable of contributing to a treatment decision even without producing a definitive diagnosis assessed from the perspective of a person skilled in the art, including a medical practitioner.

Together, the decisions confirm that Section 3(i) applies across the full clinical spectrum, irrespective of whether the method is in vivo or in vitro, labelled as screening or diagnosis, or performed by a physician or automated system. Both decisions align with The Chinese University of Hong Kong v. Controller of Patents & Designs [36] .

28. Security Deposit Ordered in SEP Dispute: Delhi High Court Directs Xiaomi to Deposit ₹272 Crore 

The Delhi High Court has directed Xiaomi Technology India Private Limited and related entities (collectively, “Xiaomi”) to deposit ₹272 crore in an ongoing Standard Essential Patent (“SEP”) infringement suit instituted by Malikie Innovations Limited (“Malikie”). The dispute concerns patents declared essential to telecommunications standards, which Malikie alleges are being used by Xiaomi without a licence.

Malikie sought interim relief contending that Xiaomi’s sale of standard-compliant devices infringed its SEP portfolio and that a security deposit was necessary to safeguard its interests pending adjudication. Xiaomi opposed the application, disputing both infringement and the basis of the royalty calculations relied upon by Malikie. 

At the interim stage, the Delhi High Court observed that a balance had to be struck between protecting the patentee’s interests and avoiding disruption to the defendant’s business operations. Without expressing a final view on infringement, validity, or FRAND licensing issues, the Court directed Xiaomi to deposit ₹272 crore as security during the pendency of the proceedings. The Court clarified that the deposit would be subject to the final outcome of the suit.

The order is a significant development in India’s evolving SEP jurisprudence and reflects the Delhi High Court’s continued willingness to grant monetary safeguards in high-value technology patent disputes pending final determination. [37]

29. Bombay High Court Sets Aside Patent Refusal Based on Atomic Energy Grounds 

The  Bombay High Court, in a judgment dated 07 April 2026, set aside orders of the Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs and the Department of Atomic Energy (“DAE”) rejecting a patent application filed by Huntington Alloys Corporation (“Huntington”). The application related to an invention titled “Ultra Supercritical Boiler Header Alloy and Method of Preparation”, concerning a high-temperature alloy designed for use in ultra-supercritical boiler systems.

Huntington challenged the rejection of its application under Section 4 of the Patents Act, which prohibits the grant of patents for inventions relating to atomic energy. The Patent Office had referred the application to the DAE under Section 20 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (“Atomic Energy Act”), following which the DAE issued a brief communication stating that the invention related to atomic energy and that the application should therefore be refused. No reasons were provided in support of this conclusion.

The Court held that although the Central Government possesses the authority to refuse patents involving atomic energy, such power must be exercised through a reasoned order. The Court observed that the absence of reasons deprived the applicant of an opportunity to understand the basis of the decision, challenge it effectively, or consider amendments permissible under the statutory framework. Finding the impugned orders to be arbitrary and unsustainable, the Court quashed them and directed the authorities to reconsider the application in accordance with law. [38]

30. Delhi High Court Sets Aside Patent Refusal for Hindsight-Based Inventive Step Analysis 

The Delhi High Court, vide judgment dated 19 May, 2026, set aside the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs’ (“Controller”) order refusing Indian Patent Application No. 201917030431 filed by Biotyx Medical Shenzhen Co. Ltd. (“Biotyx”) for an invention titled “Absorbable Stent”, on grounds of lack of inventive step under Section 2 (1) (ja) of the Patents Act, 1970 (“Patents Act”). [39]

Biotyx’s claimed invention related to an absorbable metallic stent designed to achieve a balance between a shorter corrosion and absorption cycle and enhanced radial supporting strength, two competing performance parameters through a specific structural relationship between matrix volume per unit vascular area (4-40 µm) and section length of supporting struts (0.4-9 mm). The Controller refused the application citing prior arts D1 and D2, finding that their combined teachings rendered the invention obvious.

The Delhi High Court, per Justice Jyoti Singh, found the impugned order legally unsustainable on three grounds. First, the Controller entirely omitted to deal with Biotyx’s submission on D1 in the reasoning portion of the order. Second, the Controller’s analysis of D2 was based on an impermissible hypothetical that a frustum-shaped stent in D2 would have the same properties as the claimed cylindrical stent, which constituted classic hindsight reasoning. Third, the Controller failed to identify any teaching in the prior art establishing a relationship between the two structural parameters. Relying on Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, [40] the Court remanded the matter for fresh consideration within four months.

31. No Patent for Colour-Coded Messaging Feature: Delhi High Court Upholds Blackberry Rejection 

The  Delhi High Court, in a judgment dated 30 April 2026, has upheld the rejection of a patent application filed by Blackberry Limited ("Blackberry") for a messaging feature that assigned different colours to message recipients to help users distinguish between contacts before sending messages. The Court held that the claimed invention lacked an inventive step and was excluded from patentability under the Patents Act, 1970 ("Patents Act"). 

Blackberry challenged orders of the Controller of Patents and Designs refusing its application titled “Colour Differentiating a Portion of a Text Message Shown in a Listing on a Handheld Communication Device.” Blackberry argued that the invention produced a technical effect by reducing errors in recipient selection through colour-coding based on message address characteristics. The Controller, however, concluded that the feature merely implemented a non-technical data management method and was obvious in light of prior art. 

The Delhi High Court agreed with the Controller and observed that mistakenly selecting a recipient is fundamentally a human error rather than a technical problem. The Court further noted that the claimed invention did not improve the functioning of the device or its hardware and merely relied on an algorithm for presenting information to users. Finding that the actual contribution lay in a computer program without any demonstrable technical advancement, the Court held the invention to be non-patentable under Section 3(k) of the Patents Act. The judgment reinforces the principle that software-related inventions must demonstrate a clear technical effect beyond user convenience to qualify for patent protection in India.  [41]