Employment Newsletter (March - April 2026)

45 days from the date of publication

Maharashtra Code on Wages Rules, 2026. 

The Supreme Court (“SC”) held that the purpose of maternity benefit under the Code on Social Security, 2020 (“COSS”) does not vary with the manner in which a child is brought into life of the beneficiary mother. Hence, the age limit of three months of an adopted child is unconstitutional as it denies maternity benefits to women who adopt a child aged three months or older, depriving them of the necessary social security benefits. 

Hamsaanandini Nanduri vs. Union of India & Ors., W.P (C) No. 960/ 2021

Hamsaanandini Nanduri (“Hamsaa Case”), an adoptive mother of two children, filed a writ petition before the SC. She challenged the constitutionality of Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017, which is similar to Section 60(4) of COSS.

Section 60(4) of COSS grants twelve weeks of maternity benefits only to women who adopt a child below three months of age. Women who adopt a child aged three months or older cannot claim these benefits.  

The SC addressed two issues:

• Whether the age limit of three months stipulated under Section 60(4) of COSS violates Article 14 of the Constitution ; and 
• Whether the age limit of 3 months violates an adoptive mother's right to reproductive autonomy and the adopted child's right to holistic care and development under Article 21 of the Constitution.

On the first issue, the SC conducted a constitutional and social analysis to hold that Section 60(4) violates Article 14. The SC noted that: (i) intent of the legislature is to dignify motherhood, safeguard maternal wellbeing and ensure continued participation of women in workforce; (ii) while Article 14 permits classification, such classification must rest upon a real and substantial distinction that serves the legislative purpose; (iii) the law must operate “equally on all persons under like circumstances”; and (iv) the distinction created by Section 60(4) between a woman adopting a child below the age of three months and one adopting a child aged three months or above have no “rational nexus” with the purpose of COSS ─ both categories of women are similarly situated in terms of their roles, responsibilities, and caregiving obligations. There is no material difference merely on account of the child's age at the time of adoption.

On the second issue, the SC relied on various precedents to hold that there is no distinction between the biological and adoptive mothers, and all of them have the fundamental right to life and motherhood under Article 21. Children born from either process have the right to life, care, protection, love, affection and development through their mothers, thereby maternity benefits are required to such mothers. The SC further noted that the reproductive autonomy cannot be narrowly understood as being limited to biological reproduction alone. Adoption shall be considered part of reproductive decision-making and are protected under Article 21. 

The SC therefore struck down the three-month age limit in Section 60(4) of COSS, allowing adoptive mothers to claim maternity benefits regardless of the child's age at adoption.

The SC observed that menstrual leave may discourage employers from employing women and may prove counter-productive to women's employment. 

Shailendra Mani Tripathi vs. Secretary Ministry of Women and Child Development, UOI Diary No. 73736/2025

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking paid menstrual leave for all women in all establishments and to direct the Central Government to come up with a law or a policy which would recognise the concerns of menstruating women at the workforce including providing necessary relief such as granting menstrual leave. 

While disposing of the petition, the SC observed that mandating menstrual leave through legislation would have unintended consequences on women’s employment. Such legislation would discourage employers from hiring women, thereby affecting their participation in the workforce. 

However, the SC referred to its previous orders directing the competent authority to consider the representation and formulate a model policy in consultation with relevant stakeholders.

The SC held that that if the extant service rules/regulations permit continuance of any disciplinary proceedings initiated against an employee while in service, such proceedings can be continued even after the employee retires from service.

Virender Pal Singh vs. Punjab and Sind Bank & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 3571/2026

The appellant Virender Pal Singh (“Virender”) was employed by Punjab and Sindh Bank (“Bank”). During his service, he allegedly withdrew several lakhs of rupees without documenting bills for the same. The inquiry initiated against him held that he had misused the loan amount. On the day the Bank issued him a charge sheet, he retired from the service. However, the disciplinary proceedings continued after his retirement and resulted in reducing his pay. 

Virender approached a single judge bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court (“P&H HC”) where he pleaded that the reduction of pay as a consequence of proceedings post-retirement is not permissible. The single judge bench accepted his plea. The Bank appealed before the division bench against the decision of the single judge bench, where the division bench dismissed the single judge's decision and held that when the extant service regulations permit continuation of disciplinary proceedings post-retirement, the Bank could continue such proceedings until reaching their logical conclusion.

Aggrieved by the division bench order, Virender approached the SC. Virender argued that once he had attained the age of superannuation, the master-servant relationship between him and the Bank ceased to exist and hence, reducing his pay scale as punishment could not be imposed. Relying on various precedents on similar matters, the SC reiterated that if the extant service rules/regulations permit continuation of disciplinary proceedings initiated against an employee while in service, such proceedings can continue even after his retirement. 

The SC further held that the penalty imposed pursuant to such disciplinary proceedings had a direct bearing on the pension benefits to Virender, as pension is calculated based on the last drawn salary and therefore the penalty of reduction of pay scale was valid and enforceable.

The constitutional bench of the SC has reserved its decision on the interpretation of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“IDA”)

State of UP v. Jai Bir Singh, C.A. No. 897/2002

The constitutional bench of the SC had concluded its hearing in March and reserved its judgement on the interpretation of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the IDA. The SC had to decide on the correctness of the seven-judge bench decision in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and Ors, 1978 which widened the definition of “industry” to include large number of institutions and its employees within the ambit of IDA.

For more details, please refer to our last Newsletter update  here.

The SC to examine the validity of provident fund contributions provisions for international workers.

LG Electronics India Private Limited vs. Union of India & Ors, SLP (Civil) No. 10369/2026

A petition had been filed by LG Electronics Private Limited challenging the constitutional validity of Provident Fund contributions by International Workers mandated under Para 83 of the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952.

The matter is scheduled for hearing in the month of July, 2026. 

A petition is pending before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Amendment Act” 

Laxmi Narayan Tripathi vs. Union of India, Diary No. 20054/2026

A petition had been filed challenging the Amendment Act for violating Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. 

The petitioner contends that the Amendment Act eliminates the right to self-identification of gender recognised as a fundamental right in National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) vs. Union of India, 2014.

The matter however is pending before the three-judge bench.

For context, please refer to the Legal Updates section above.

A similar petition has been filed before the Delhi High Court (“Delhi HC”) (Chandresh Jain vs. Union of India W.P. No.4587/2026). The next hearing is scheduled on July 22, 2026.

Karnataka High Court  directed the state to strictly implement the menstrual leave policy to provide one day paid menstrual leave to women across all sectors including “unorganised sector” in Karnataka.

Smt. Chandravva Hanamant Govai vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors., W.P.No. 109734/2025 (GM-RES)

The High Court directed the state to implement the menstrual leave policy "strictly and faithfully" across all sectors (organised and unorganised) until the Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025 (the "Bill") becomes law.

Background:

• Last year, Karnataka introduced a menstrual leave policy through a notification dated November 12, 2025 and subsequently an order dated November 20, 2025 (the “Policy”). The Policy granted one day of paid menstrual leave to women employees in the age group of 18 to 52 years in the state's “organised sectors” only.
• Karnataka also proposed the Bill which is now placed before the state legislature. The Bill goes further and provides two days of paid leave per month, 2% attendance relaxation for menstruating students, a work from home option, besides other benefits.

The present petition concerns a woman daily wager working at a hotel in Belagavi. She submitted that her menial tasks involve relentless physical labour from morning to evening. Arguing on the grounds of dignity, workplace justice and gender equity, she asked the court to extend the Policy to the “unorganised sector” as well.

A single judge bench reiterated that the right to menstrual health is an integral part of right to live with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court relied on various Supreme Court rulings including the most recent ruling in Hamsaa Case and held that the state must also consider the “unorganised workers” for menstrual benefits under the Policy, until the Bill comes into force.  The HC further directed the state that until the Bill is enacted, the state must operationalise the Policy by issuing suitable guidelines, circulars, and administrative instructions to ensure consistent implementation of the Policy covering all sectors whether organised or unorganised in the state.

A separate challenge questioning the constitutionality of the Policy is presently pending before the Bengaluru bench of the Karnataka High Court in Bangalore Hotels Association v. Govt. of Karnataka, W.P. 36659/2025. The next hearing is scheduled for June 05, 2026.

The Bombay High Court (“Bombay HC”) held that the domestic enquiry cannot be invalidated merely because the enquiry did not follow the exact format of committee prescribed under the Vishaka Judgement. The determinative question is whether the enquiry followed the principles of fairness and natural justice and caused no prejudice to the workman. 

Glaxo   Smith Klin Pharmaceutics Limited vs. Suhas Shankar Pagare and Ors. W.P.No. 2297/2026

Suhas Shankar Pagare (“Mr. Suhas”) was employed with Glaxo Smith Kline Pharmaceutics Limited (“Glaxo Pharma”). In 2011, he was   allegedly involved in sexual harassment and physical assault of a woman employee of Glaxo Pharma. Glaxo Pharma conducted a preliminary inquiry and served a show cause notice on Mr. Suhas and  upon receiving no satisfactory response, the company filed a chargesheet and initiated a domestic enquiry against Mr. Suhas under the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959 (“Standing Orders”). 

During the disciplinary enquiry, Mr. Suhas was given an opportunity to be heard. Based on the enquiry report, Glaxo Pharma terminated Mr. Suhas with immediate effect. Mr. Suhas then raised an industrial dispute contending Glaxo Pharma could not bypass Vishakha Guidelines and accordingly, his termination was invalid.  

The Tribunal held that the enquiry against Mr. Suhas was neither fair nor legal as it violated the principles of natural justice and the Vishakha judgement which mandated the constitution of a “Complaint Committee”. 

As a result, Glaxo Pharma filed a petition before the Bombay HC, contending that the Tribunal erred in law by holding the enquiry illegal merely because a separate “Complaint Committee” was not constituted in the exact format prescribed in Vishakha judgement. 

The Bombay HC held that, if the enquiry was conducted where the workman was informed of the allegations; given access to the complaint and supporting material; allowed to participate in the proceedings, and given a fair chance to defend himself, then the requirement of fairness is satisfied and in such cases even if the forum which conducted enquiry was not formally named as “Complaints Committee” in exact language of Vishakha guidelines, that is not sufficient to invalidate the enquiry. The purpose of Vishakha guidelines was to ensure fairness, sensitivity and protection against arbitrary action, if that purpose is achieved, structural differences in form do not render the enquiry invalid. The determinative question is whether the enquiry caused actual prejudice to the workman. 

The Bombay HC remanded the matter to the Tribunal for re-consideration of its decision in accordance with the law and in light of the above observations.

The Bombay HC held that the EPFO cannot deny employees their pension benefits because the employer failed to submit documents or the authority failed to maintain proper records. The EPFO must inquire based on the available material and independently verify claims before rejecting them. 

Durga Srinivas Kallakuri and Ors vs. The Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) and Ors. W.P.No. 4826/2026

Durga Srinivas Kallakuri (“Durga”) was engaged in various capacities with different employers. He remained in continuous service until his superannuation. Durga was also eligible for benefits under the Employee’s Pension Scheme, 1995. He regularly contributed to the Employee’s Provident Fund Organisation (“EPFO”) without any default.

Following the SC’s  direction in EPFO vs. Sunil Kumar B (2022), which required the EPFO to allow eligible employees to opt for pension on higher wages exceeding INR 15,000/-, Durga applied for this joint option and submitted all required documents to the EPFO. The EPFO then asked Durga's employer to provide proof of joint options, evidence of provident fund and pension contributions on excess wages, and Forms 3A and 6A with challans. The employer informed the EPFO that all relevant documents and returns had already been submitted and hence, not required resubmission. Therefore, EPFO rejected the Durga’s application o for want of requisite documents that were specifically asked from the employer. 

Durga argued that it is the Employer’s obligation to maintain  documents such as Form 6A and submit the same to the EPFO. He contended that despite making regular contributions towards Pension Fund on higher wages, the EPFO denied him benefits due to non-submission of records. He therefore approached the Bombay HC.

The main issue was: can the EPFO deny an eligible employee's pension benefit on higher wages merely because the employer failed to submit every required document, even when the available materials corroborate the employee's claim.

The Bombay HC held that, it is a settled law that the employer is responsible for preparing, maintaining, and filing returns with the authority. This obligation rests with the employer. Employees cannot be penalised for their employer's failure to produce such records. The Bombay HC further noted that, for older records, the authority cannot demand perfect documentation and must instead rely on available materials. Further, the pension scheme is a beneficial legislation and must not be used to create hurdles for genuine claimants. Therefore, while conditions for eligibility are necessary, the authority must assess compliance practically and not rigidly. Therefore, the Court remanded the matter to the EPFO to reconsider Durga’s pension application on higher wages.

The Bombay HC held that when an undertaking is transferred, the transferee becomes the employer and takes on liability for retrenchment, closure compensation, and related dues.

Managing Director, Jolly Steel Industries Pvt. Ltd. And Another vs. Sarva Shramik Sanghatana, W.P.No. 9470/2003

Jolly Steel Industries Pvt Ltd (“Transferor”) leased its premises and machinery to the M/s. Gupta Steel Ind (“Transferee”), who also requisitioned certain employees from the Transferor. These employees continued to work without interruption and were regularly paid wages by the Transferor. In 1993, however, the Transferee ceased its operations. This gave rise to a dispute as to who was liable to pay retrenchment compensation to the transferred employees. The Industrial Court held that the Transferor was liable to pay such compensation, following which the Transferor approached the Bombay High Court.

The Transferor contended that the lease agreement covered only the liability arising at the time of transfer and did not impose any future liability for retrenchment or closure compensation. The Transferee, on the other hand argued that the lease agreement continued to bind the Transferor even after the transfer of employees, as no subsequent agreement had expressly shifted the liability for retrenchment compensation to the Transferee.

The Bombay High Court ruled in favour of the Transferor, holding that the lease agreement must be read as a whole. While the agreement imposed liability on the Transferor for the severance of employees at the time of transfer, the transfer of such employees to Transferee did not create a permanent liability on the Transferor, particularly in the absence of any control over their employment. The Court observed that it would be incongruous for one party to pay wages and control employment while the other bears the liability for termination. Since Transferee was in actual control of the employment, and the Transferor was neither in possession of the factory, nor running its operations, nor supervising the employees, the Court held that the liability for retrenchment compensation — including closure compensation, legal dues, and all consequential benefits — rested with Transferee.

The Delhi HC restrained a forensic investigator from disclosing or circulating a privileged investigation report, citing breach of legal privilege and confidentiality. 

Kochhar & Co vs. Nilesh Ukunde, I.A. 9337/2026

Kochhar & Co (“Kochhar”) was engaged by Mylan Laboratories Limited (“Mylan Lab”) for a privileged investigation into a fire incident. For the said investigation, Kochhar engaged a forensic consultant, who sub-contracted Nilesh Ukunde (“Nilesh”) as a forensic investigator. The engagement letter and purchase order both obligated Nilesh to maintain strict confidentiality and legal privilege over all information, documents and materials obtained during the investigation. 

Kochhar alleged that during the investigation, Nilesh disclosed critical information to the employees of Mylan Lab and other individuals, including suspects, thereby compromising the integrity of the investigation. Kochhar then directed the contractor to issue Nilesh a notice to cease all work. Nilesh then prepared an unauthorised report containing confidential and privileged information and shared it with the police authorities and some third parties. Nilesh also contacted witnesses, suspects, and Mylan Lab employees in an attempt to interfere with Kochhar's investigation. 

The Delhi HC found a prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of Kochhar, noting that Kochhar would suffer irreparable harm in case the injunction was not passed. Therefore, the Court restrained Nilesh, his agents, and all persons acting on his behalf from disclosing, publishing or circulating the report and any confidential or privileged information relating to Kochhar’s assignment.

The next hearing is scheduled for August 27, 2026.